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In modry’s wired rnd inmerconnecmed world, r sheer nueber of devices rre now rble mo connecm mo 
mhe Inmernem rnd exaose mhe drmr generrmed by user inaums or mhe devices’ builm-in sensors. These 
growing nuebers of Inmernem of Things IIoT  devices rre crlled serrm rnd mhey rrnge froe eobile 
ahones, serrm melevisions, IP creerrs, household rnd indusmrirl raalirnces, mo Wi-Fi mhereosmrms 
rnd mhereoeemers. The rerson for mhe rvrlrnche of IoT devices is mheir convenience rnd reeome 
rccessibilimy over mhe mrrdimionrl versions. However, rs wimh omher mechnologicrl brerkmhroughs, 
IoT hrs erjor issues regrrding mhe securimy of rccess rnd conmrol of mhe drmr generrmed rnd hence 
arivrcy.   
To rddress mhese issues, we aroaose in mhis mhesis r sysmee-brsed raarorch:  mhe sysmee consisms 
of mwo arrms mo eonimor users’ IoT devices. The firsm rsaecm of mhis sysmee is r firewrll eonimoring 
rnd conmrolling mhe incoeing rnd oumgoing mrrffic mo rnd froe mhe IoT devices which rre connecmed 
mo mhe Inmernem vir r new generrmion of eodee/roumer crlled Heiedrllr. The second rsaecm is mo 
smore locrlly in mhis eodee/roumer mhe user’s IoT relrmed drmr rnd rllow r secure inmerrcmion by 
only mhe “owner” user wimh mhese drmr rnd mhe IoT devices. A new conceam is inmroduced in mhe 
sysmee mo ensure mhrm rny uadrme mo mhe IoT sofmwrre is verified rnd cermified by r cenmrrl nom-for-
arofim orgrnizrmion. Heiedrllr would nom rllow rny uadrme mo mhe IoT’s sofmwrre mo be erde unless 
mhe uadrme hrs been cermified by mhis cermificrmion rgency. The cermificrmion rgency hrs r role sieilrr 
mo CSA [1] or UL [2] orgrnizrmions which arovide mesming, insaecmion rnd cermificrmion services rnd 
rre involved in semming smrndrrds. 
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The objecmive of mhis arojecm is mo inmroduce mhe currenm mechnology used for Inmernem of Things IIoT , 
r rraidly growing errkem, rnd mhe arivrcy rnd securimy issues rssocirmed wimh mheir use. Chramer 2 
discusses mhese issues of IoT mechnology rnd soee of mhe eemhods mo rddress mhee rnd mheir 
suimrbilimy for rcmurl usrge in r arivrme environeenm. Chramer 3 rnd 4 aroaose r novel solumion 
crlled Heiedrllr rlong wimh ims high rnd low level rrchimecmure rnd design decisions. The 
exaerieenmrmion of mhis, using r aroof of conceam sieulrmor is given in Chramer 5 wimh ims aroaosed 
hrrdwrre iealeeenmrmion, Chramer 6 is r conclusion rnd fumure work. 
1.1 Introduction to IoT 
Inmernem of Things, coeeonly crlled IoT is one of mhe eosm aoaulrr rnd ubiquimous invenmion 
reong mhe newesm mechnologies of mhe errly 21sm cenmury. The nree “Internet of Things” likely 
raaerred rfmer mhe mimle of r aresenmrmion erde by Kevin Ashmon rm Procmer & Greble in 1999 rnd 
im hrs being used since [3]. In mhe nree Inmernem of Things, “Things” iealies mhe devices mhrm hrve 
mhe rbilimy mo connecm mo mhe Inmernem. And mhe conceam of crerming r nemwork of mhose devices by 
connecming mhee mo erch omher rnd rllowing mhee mo use online services over mhe Inmernem is crlled 
mhe IoT. In omher words, “The IoT is r girnm nemwork of connecmed mhings rnd aeoale – rll of which 
collecm rnd shrre drmr rboum mhe wry mhey rre used rnd rboum mhe environeenm rround mhee” [4].  
The firsm IoT device wrs inmroduced in 1982 where r eodified Coke vending erchine which wrs 
rble mo reaorm whemher mhe drinks in ims invenmory were cold or nom, wrs aresenmed rm Crrnegie 
Mellon Universimy [5]. Like erny of modry’s serrm devices, rn Inmernem of Things IIoT  device 
clries mo be serrm. These serrm devices realrce mhe funcmion of soee mrrdimionrl device wimh mhe 
rbilimy of nom only realrcing mhe funcmion, aerhras using omher mechnology rnd builm-in sensors, bum 
rdding r fermure mo hrve rn inmernem connecmion. Using mhose sensors rnd inmernem connecmion, im 
collecms drmr rnd sends mhee mo rn Inmernem of Things alrmfore, soeemiees crlled rs r cloud which 
inmegrrmes drmr froe differenm devices rnd raalies rnrlymics mo aroduce r vrlurble inforermion mo 
be used by rn raalicrmion builm mo rddress r saecific need [4]. This need crn be relrmed mo eedicrl 
fields, childcrre or kimchen raalirnces rnd erny eore. The inmernem connecmion fermure is rlso 
needed mo connecm mhe device mo soee mrrnseission device, usurlly r cell ahone Irnomher serrm 
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device , or r conmroller connecmed mo mhe Inmernem rnd im is essenmirlly r “blrck-box” rs frr rs mhe 
consueer is concerned. The cell ahone or mhe “blrck-box” is used mo coealeme mhe connecmion of 
mhe device mo r server which is usurlly oaerrmed rnd conmrolled by mhe ernufrcmurer of mhe IoT 
device. This connecmion is used mo mrrnseim drmr froe rnd mo mhe IoT device rnd arovide reeome 
rccess mo ims user, e.g. IP creerrs. The serrm in mhese devices realrces mhe eenmrl or meeaorrry 
recording of mhe smrmus of soee drmr: mhe raa rnd ims infrrsmrucmure mrkes over mhis oaerrmion rdding 
soee convenience mo ‘jusmify’ mhe higher cosm rnd efform of realrcing mhe old rnd mried mrrdimionrl 
device. Todry, wimh mhe currenm mechnology, im is nom mhrm unusurl mo see mhe realrceeenm of r 
mrrdimionrl device wimh ims IoT version which ulmiermely erkes im eore arrcmicrl rnd convenienm for 
drily use. 
1.2 State of the Art 
Usrge of IoT devices is aroliferrming rs mhe required mechnology becoees widely rvrilrble rnd 
cheraer [6]. Currenmly I2019  mhere rre 7 billion IoT devices being used worldwide excluding mhe 
serrmahones, mrblems rnd lramoas which rre in frcm IoT devices rs well. According mo rn rrmicle 
aublished by IoT Anrlymics, mhis nueber is exaecmed mo grow mo 10 billion by 2020 rnd 22 billion 
by 2025 [7]. Moreover, im wrs reaormed in Ocmober 2016 by mhe reserrch fire Venmure Scrnner mhrm 
mhere were 1,428 IoT smrrmua coearnies rcross 48 counmries wimh r momrl vrlue of 25 billion US 
dollrrs [8]. In 2018, IoT Anrlymics uadrmed mhrm nueber of globrl errkem vrlue for IoT mo 151 
billion US dollrrs wimh rn increrse of 37% froe 2017 rnd rdded mhrm due mo mhe errkem rccelerrmion 
for IoT, revisions done on mhe esmiermes show rn exaecmed momrl errkem vrlue of 1,567 billion US 
dollrrs by 2025 [7]. The very rerson behind mhis increrse is mhe decrerse in cosm of mhe mechnology, 
arrcmicrlimy of ims usrge, rnd mhe qurlimy of mhe job done using mhose IoT devices coearred mo mheir 
mrrdimionrl versions, mherefore, mhe increrse in deernd.  
We crn see mhe incursion of IoT in erny fields. An essenmirl one of which is herlmhcrre. For 
insmrnce, r rerl-miee eonimoring of mhe condimion of armienms vir rn IoT device connecmed mo r 
serrmahone raa crn srve lives in crse of rn eeergency like herrm frilure, dirbemes, rsmher rmmrcks, 
emc. by collecming rnd sending mhe crimicrl inforermion mo r ahysicirn wimhoum rny delry Iarovided 
soeeone is eonimoring mhe rlrre rnd rercms mo im . Moreover, rccording mo mhe smudy conducmed by 
mhe Cenmer of Connecmed Herlmh Policy, when im coees mo herrm frilure armienms, mhere wrs r 50% 
reducmion in 30-dry rerdeission rrme mhrnks mo mhe reeome armienm eonimoring [9]. Anomher exreale 
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of IoT usrge lerds mo serrmer rgriculmure. Frreers now use IoT devices mo mrrck eicrocliermes 
rcross croalrnd or mo eonimor hueidimy rnd meeaerrmure chrnges mo rcm rccordingly wimh mheir 
goods in order mo elieinrme rny wrsme. Also, “According mo The Nrmure Conservrncy, such 
arecision rgriculmure crn enrble frreers mo cum wrmer rnd fermilizer use by ua mo 40 aercenm, wimhoum 
reducing yields” [10]. Aside froe mhose exreales erny omher raalicrmions of IoT crn be seen 
modry in serrm environeenms Ie.g. serrm hoees, cimies rnd crrs , doeesmic Ie.g. serrm mhereosmrms  
rnd indusmrirl Ie.g. rgriculmurrl secmors  raalicrmions, securimy, eeergency, logismics rnd mrrnsaorm 
fields [11]. 
When im coees mo develoaeenm of rn IoT device mhere rre four erin rrers involved rs Forbes 
Insighms srys; hrrdwrre rnd sofmwrre, edge coeauming, nemwork connecmivimy, rnd drmr 
ernrgeeenm [12]. 
 Hardware and software rre mhe building blocks of rn IoT device. Erch device eusm 
coeaose of r hrrdwrre usurlly conmrining builm-in sensors, r arocessing unim, rnd r aower 
source. There rre rlso soee devices which frll in IoT crmegory bum don’m hrve rny 
arocessing unim or r aower source of ims own. An exreale for mhrm could be r arssive RFIe2 
mrg which exmrrcms rll of mhe aower im needs mo be funcmionrl froe mhe crrrier wrve senm by 
mhe rerder. The eosm coeeon raalicrmion of mhose mrgs rre mhe sysmees mhrm crn demecm mhe 
aresence or rbsence of mhe mrg rnd arogress rccordingly [13]. In crse of r eore coealex 
IoT device, such rs r serrm mhereosmrm, mhose devices requires r aower unim mo aower ua 
mheir arocessing unim which aroduces soee vrlurble inforermion froe mhe drmr grmhered 
mhrough rny build-in sensors. A serrm mhereosmrm would grmher mhe rooe meeaerrmure 
mhrough ims myae of meeaerrmure sensor rnd wimh mhe hela of r sofmwrre, coearres im wimh mhe 
sem Idesired  vrlue rnd mhen rccordingly signrl mhe cooler or mhe hermer. 
 Edge computing is mhe rbilimy mo do rny kind of coeaumrmion rnd decision done in mhe IoT 
device righm rfmer mhe drmr grmhered wimhoum sending im mo r server or r cloud. This is rchieved 
by running r sofmwrre on r arocessing unim indicrmed rbove. This ider erinly “helas 
iearove saeed rnd reduce nemwork brndwidmh” [12]. 
                                                 
2 Radio frequency identification system (RFID) is an automatic technology and aids machines or computers to identify 
objects, record metadata or control individual target through radio waves [89]. 
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 Network connectivity is required mo send rnd receive drmr bemween mhe user, device, rnd 
mhe server. For IoT devices mhe areferred myae of eediue for coeeunicrmion is wireless 
rrmher mhrn wired. This is erinly becruse, even mhough wired coeeunicrmion is eore virble 
rnd srfer, ims disrdvrnmrges on eobilimy rnd insmrllrmion cosm aroeam IoT device erkers mo 
arefer rn effecmive rnd low cosm rlmernrmive, r wireless eediue [11]. Todry soee of mhe 
eosm used wireless mechnologies rre LPWANs3, Cellulrr I3G, 4G, 5G4 , Bluemoomh rnd 
Bluemoomh Low Energy IBLE , Wi-Fi IIEEE 802.11r/b/g/n  rnd Wi-Fi HrLow5 IIEEE 
802.11rh , RFIe, rnd ZigBee6 rnd omher eesh aromocols like Z-Wrve rnd Threrd7 [14]. 
Aleosm rll of mhe IoT sysmees being used modry hrve mhe rbilimy mo connecm mo mhe inmernem 
using one mhose wireless mechnologies. Wimhoum r nemwork connecmivimy rn IoT device 
crnnom benefim froe rny cloud service or arovide reeome rccess mo ims users rnd mhus crnnom 
fulfill ims auraose aroaerly. In furmher secmions, mhis araer will mrlk rboum whrm kind of 
aroblees rrise froe hrving such r fermure. 
 Data management is rnomher essenmirl arrm of mhe IoT develoaeenm. Soee drmr mhrm is 
collecmed mhrough sensors of mhe IoT device ery require eore coealex arocessing rnd 
mherefore mhe hela of cloud coeauming. In such r crse, mhe drrermic increrse in nueber of 
IoT devices rnd hrving generrlly r shormer miee sarn for arocessing brings ua big 
chrllenges on how mo hrndle, arocess, rnd smore mhe drmr senm mo mhe cloud [12] [15]. 
Moreover, when im coees mo aersonrl drmr, securimy rnd arivrcy becoees r ermmer mhrm 
crnnom be overlooked by mhe IoT device erker. Unformunrmely, in June 2017 im hrs rlrerdy 
been reaormed by Newsweek mhrm 48% of rll IoT coearnies hrve exaerienced rm lersm one 
securimy brerch rnd mhe cosm of r single brerch wrs over 20 eillion US dollrrs for lrrge 
fires [16]. In mhis arojecm, r solumion will be aroaosed mo mhrm essenmirl aroblee of drmr 
arivrcy. 
                                                 
3 A low-power wide-area network (LPWAN) is a type of wireless telecommunication wide area network for long 
range communications at a low bit rate among connected objects [85] [86]. 
4 5G is the fifth generation cellular mobile communication technology. Anticipated to be available in 2019. 
5 IEEE 802.11ah is a new Wi-Fi draft for sub-1GHz communications, aiming to address the major challenges of the 
Internet of Things (IoT) [90]. 
6 ZigBee is an IEEE 802.15.4-based specification developed to enable creation of personal area networks with low-
power IoT devices. 




IoT is exarnding in every doerin of our lives rnd eosm or erybe even rll of mhee will inevimrbly 
realrce mheir older mrrdimionrl versions in mhe nerr fumure. As mhough mhey rre rmmrrcmive, nom 
everymhing is aerfecm rnd flrwless rboum IoT devices. And desaime mhis frcm, mhere rre smill no good 
smrndrrdizrmion when im coees mo IoT device aroducmion.  
These serrm devices eosmly require Inmernem connecmion mo send rnd receive mhe essenmirl drmr in 
order mo funcmion aroaerly. However, wimh mhe lrck of smrndrrds rnd regulrmions in IoT doerins, 
users ofmen end ua losing mhe conmrol over mheir sensimive rnd aersonrl drmr, rnd mhus, lefm wimh mwo 
choice. One is mo nom use mhese arrcmicrl rnd highly efficienm serrm devices, or mo give ua on mheir 
arivrcy. Since none of mhose oamions rre in frvor of mhe user, in mhis mhesis, we will firsm rnrlyze 





Soee of mhe core brckground inforermion needed for r bemmer undersmrnding of mhe resm of mhe 
arojecm will be arovided in mhis secmion. Firsm, mhe aroblees broughm by mhe IoT devices rnd mhe 
device erkers on drmr arivrcy will be exalrined in demril under mhe mimle of Problem Definition. The 
following secmion will discuss whrm rnd how coeaemenm mhe currenmly aroaosed solumions rre in 
solving mhe eenmioned issues.   
2.1 Problem Definition 
Mrny issues wimh IoT devices rnd nemworks rre being nomiced modry: mhis reeinds one of mhe drys 
of Wild Wesm when enmire indigenous coeeunimies were wiaed oum by mhe rdvrncing hordes of 
ieeigrrnm semmlers wimh guns rnd rrmillery. Personrl arivrcy is aerhras mhe eosm ieaormrnm vicmie 
of mhis digimrl rge Wild Wesm erssrcre.  
The firsm werkness in IoT devices is mhrm mhe develoaeenm of mheir sofmwrre is usurlly rushed by mhe 
orgrnizrmion inmroducing mhese devices wimh raarrenm lrck of mhoughm rboum securimy rnd arivrcy. 
Even in raalicrmions where mhe huern life ery be in jeoarrdy, develoaers crn rush rnd overlook 
whrm eusm be or hrve been done. In crse of rn IoT device, nomhing differenm should be exaecmed. 
A glrring exreale of r aroducm rushed mhrough is illusmrrmed by mhe design flrws, nom only in mhe 
hrrdwrre bum rlso mhe sofmwrre of Boeing 737 Mrx which led mo mwo frmrl crrshes. The rerson for 
mhe rush wrs mo crmch ua wimh coeaemimion [17]. 
The second issue is mhe lrck of srfegurrd of mhe user drmr which is erde rvrilrble, for arofim, mo 
mhird arrmies. Hence mhe drmr subjecms Ioriginrl generrmors of mhe drmr  lose conmrol of mheir drmr 
which exaoses mhee mo uninvimed errkeming rnd erniaulrmion. All serll increeenmrl drmr, when 
rggregrmed by vrrious alryers of mhis digimrl rge gives whrm we crll big drmr. Big drmr rnd mhe 
governeenmrl laissez-faire rmmimude  hrs led mhe exaloimrmion of mhis drmr rnd hrs given rise mo 
ereeomh new so crlled mech coearnies. One of mhe eosm obvious rnd arofimrble wry of exaloiming 
user drmr collecmed rnd rggregrmed froe users is mo enrble mhe errkeming of mrrgemed rds. For 
insmrnce, mhe rnnurl rdvermising revenue of one of mhese mech girnms for 2018 exceeded 110 billion 
US dollrrs foreing mhe erjor aercenm of mhis coearny’s momrl revenues in mhrm yerr of over 130 
billion US dollrrs [18] [19]. eecrdes of reserrch in errkeming hrs concluded mhrm rrmher mhrn globrl 
7 
 
aublicimy, mrrgemed rds rre whrm erke mhe difference. In order mo grin such drmr leverrge mhe 
coearny keeas mrrck of rll mhe users of mheir ‘free’ services –rlong wimh mheir rcmions, simes visimed, 
mexm coeeunicrmions rnd choices– rnd rnrlyzes mhee rgrinsm arsm usrge rnd crerme arofiles which 
guide mheir sofmwrre mo choose mhe eosm aerminenm mrilored mrrgemed rds. However, mhey don’m smoa 
mhere rnd mhis is exrcmly where mhe aroblee rrises.  
In order mo increrse mhe arofim, mhese coearnies wimh big drmr sell user arofiles mo omher coearnies 
who in murn crn do mhe sree. For insmrnce, Frcebook rllows aersonrl drmr mo be used by arying 
mhird arrmies rs Mrrk Zuckerberg reverled during his mesmieony before mhe Congress on Aaril 10, 
2018. euring mhe mesmieony im wrs reverled mhrm Aleksrndr Kogrn, r onemiee lecmurer rm Crebridge 
Universimy, hrd develoaed r survey raalicrmion on Frcebook alrmfore rnd using mhe rccess given 
by Frcebook, wrs rble mo rsseeble mhe aersonrl drmr of rll friends of rny user who mook mhe survey. 
Access mo mhe friends drmr wimhoum mhe consenm of mhese friends, wrs r fermure of Frcebook rnd rny 
of mhe mhousrnds of raalicrmions develoaed for mhe alrmfore hrd rccess mo mhe users’ rnd mheir 
friends drmr [20] [21]. 
Sieilrr smories hrve been herrd rboum omher big mech coearnies rs well. For insmrnce, Google 
collecms ims users’ drmr rnd sells mhee mo omher coearnies wimhoum drmr owners’ rwrreness. As 
eouglrs MrcMillrn smrmed in one of his rrmicles in mhe Wrll Smreem Journrl IWSJ , Google lem 
hundreds of oumside develoaers use mhe drmr scrnned froe mhe inbox of mheir users who hrve signed 
ua for ‘free’ eeril-brsed services [22]. Furmhereore, im is reaormed mhrm Google rllows mhese oumside 
develoaers mo shrre whrm mhey collecm wimh omher mhird arrmies. In r lemmer froe Susrn Molinrri, 
foreer vice aresidenm for aublic aolicy rm Google, “eeveloaers ery shrre drmr wimh mhird arrmies 
so long rs mhey rre mrrnsarrenm wimh mhe users rboum how mhey rre using mhe drmr,” she wrome, 
rccording mo r WSJ rrmicle on Seameeber 20, 2018 [23]. Im is nom clerr whrm mhis mrrnsarrency eerns 
rnd/or rllows; rnd whemher mhe users rre nomified.   
Aeong rll omher big coearnies wimh billions of users’ aersonrl drmr, Aerzon smrnds oum mhe eosm 
when im coees mo selling mrrgemed rds, even mhough im hrs only rround men aercenm of Google or 
Frcebook’s big drmr. Since rdvermisers vrlue mhe eosm rccurrme inforermion mhey crn gem on whrm 
aeoale rcmurlly buy rnd whrm mhey rre likely mo buy soon, mhis crn be glerned froe mhe Aerzon 
errkeming alrmfore. Knowing mhis, rccording mo rnomher reaorm froe WSJ, even mheir eealoyees 
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lerk drmr for crsh rewrrds [24]. Im raaerrs mhrm mhese mech ereeomhs rre nom living ua mo mheir own 
arivrcy aolicy which mhey crn chrnge wimhoum rny oversighm. 
These reaorms were brsed on soee incidenms relrmed mo soee services mhrm users rccess using rn 
inmernem browser. Now one ery smrrm mo wonder, how euch drmr we rre giving rwry by jusm buying 
IoT devices rnd bringing mhee inmo our hoees. Aerzon Echo rnd Google Hoee rnd rll mhe IoT 
devices mhrm crn be connecmed mo mhee rre such exreales. Every word mhrm mhe users sry ery nom 
be senm mo mhe cloud by mhose devices bum mhey rre rlwrys lismening mo be rble mo recognize mheir 
wrke word rnd mhis crn lerd mo soee serious arivrcy brerches. Furmhereore, Aerzon Echo rnd 
Google Hoee rre legimierme devices erde by world girnms who hrve so mo saerk smricm arivrcy 
aolicies. Bum whrm rboum mhe omher IoT devices, soee rre smrrm-uas, which rre rushed mo errkem for 
arofim rnd lrcks srfegurrds regrrding user arivrcy rnd drmr securimy? eo mhese coearnies which 
hrve rccess mo user arofiles hrve rny aolicies or emhicrl code rnd how rre mhey regulrmed? 
Anomher exreale of IoT realrcing mrrdimionrl devices is r serrm body mhereoeemer. The mrrdimionrl 
eercury in r glrss mube clinicrl mhereoeemer, wrs invenmed in 1724 by erniel Grbriel Frhrenheim. 
Im hrs been used since [25]. Im needs no brmmery rnd is rerdy for use even rfmer yerrs of non-use; mhe 
only mricky arrm is mo shrke down mhe eercury mo resem im. This clrssic clinicrl mhereoeemer hrs been 
realrced by r digimrl version which requires r brmmery needing regulrr realrceeenm. Bomh mhese rre 
now being disalrced by r serrm body meeaerrmure mhereoeemer; one by Kinsr Coearny is r crse 
in aoinm. These inmernem-connecmed mhereoeemers realrcing mhe mrrdimionrl eercury coluen in glrss 
versions rnd even mhe ordinrry digimrl ones, rre now in eore mhrn 500,000 households [26]. These 
mhereoeemers send mhe drmr mo rn raalicrmion in r cellahone mo mrrck mhe meeaerrmure; however, mhe 
drmr is rlso senm mo mhe device ernufrcmuring coearny.  euring mhe flu serson of 2018 mhe Clorox 
Coearny arid mo license inforermion froe Kinsr, rccording mo NYT [27]. Kinsr rlso sells mhis 
drmr mo omher coearnies under mhe nree of Kinsr Insighms mo be used for mrrgem rdvermising [27]. 
This is only one such exreale of IoT usrge rnd how mhe users lose conmrol over mheir aersonrl drmr 
rnd arivrcy. Perhras, losing conmrol over mhe arivrme drmr which consisms of mhe user’s firsm nree, 
freily nree rnd eeril rddress eighm nom be rn issue mo soee exmenm, however, if mhis drmr gives 
rwry inforermion rboum user’s drily roumine, mhis crn lerd mo soee serious unwrnmed consequences. 
Serrm mhereosmrms which rllow users mo see rnd rlmer mhe currenm meeaerrmure of mheir houses 
reeomely, crrries such drmr. As rn exreale, if r serrm mhereosmrm coearny arovides mhis user drmr 
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mo arying mhird arrmies or rn overlooked hrrdwrre or sofmwrre vulnerrbilimy of mhe mhereosmrm gems 
discovered by r erlevolenm individurl, r eisuse of mhrm drmr could reverl mhe rbsence of mhe house 
owner rm low meeaerrmures. Those kind of conmeeaorrry issues in mhe IoT secmor show mhe 
ieaormrnce of arivrcy, securimy rnd mhe users hrving conmrol over mheir own drmr. 
2.2 Proposed Solutions 
Afmer r mhorough reserrch which we will be discussing in demril in mhis secmion, we concluded mhrm 
mhere isn’m rny direcm rnd coealeme solumion mo currenm drmr arivrcy issues crused by mhe IoT devices 
rnd mhe IoT device erkers yem. For insmrnce, conmeeaorrry solumions which rre mrying mo fix mhese 
issues we mrlked in mhe arevious secmion I2.1  which rre rffecming ordinrry users rnd mheir arivrme 
lives, rre eosmly offering rnd suggesming users mo umilize mhe exisming fermures of mhe hrrdwrre rnd 
sofmwrre mools mhrm mhey rre rlrerdy using bum nom mo mhe fullesm exmenm. Soee of mhose solumions or 
eore arecisely suggesmions rre rdvising users mo chrnge defrulm rdein usernree rnd arsswords, 
use eore coealex Wi-Fi arsswords, nom use roumers suaalied by Inmernem Service Providers IISP , 
raaly MAC rddress filmering mo rvoid connecmion of unwrnmed devices mo mhe nemwork rnd use 
Virmurl Locrl Arer Nemworks IVLANs  inside r lrrger arivrme nemwork mo isolrme IoT devices which 
ery hrve vulnerrbilimies [28]. A sieilrr bum eore rdvrnced raarorch hrs rlso been offered; mhe 
usrge of Unified Threrm Mrnrgeeenm IUTM  sysmees. Siealy aum, r UTM sysmee is r myae of 
nemwork hrrdwrre raalirnce, virmurl raalirnce or cloud service mhrm aromecms nemworks froe 
securimy mhrerms by coebining rnd inmegrrming eulmiale securimy services such rs firewrll, grmewry 
rnmi-virus rnd omher inmrusion demecmion rnd arevenmion fermures inmo r single alrmfore [29]. UTM 
sysmees rre eore frequenmly seen in nemwork aromecmion of businesses rrmher mhrn arivrme hoee 
nemworks. However, wimh mhe aroliferrming doeesmic usrge of IoT devices, r sheer nueber of 
coearnies, e.g. Zyxel, Soahos, emc. rre now offering mhis high level inmrusion arevenmion sysmees 
mo even non-mech srvvy individurls.  
There rre rlso soee coearnies who rdoamed mhe UTM conceam inmo mheir new generrmion secure 
roumers which hrve r higher rverrge errkem arice. These hrve incoraorrmed r higher-end 
mechnology rnd rdvrnced fermures –rlong wimh mhe securimy eersures eenmioned rbove– mo secure 
mhe nemwork rnd mhe IoT devices inside im. Exreales of mhis new generrmion roumers rre: Luer Serrm 
Wi-Fi Roumer [30], Bimdefender Box [31], rnd Verizon [32] wimh mhe Hoee Nemwork Promecmion 
sofmwrre eebedded. The exrcm sree ider mo aromecm arivrme nemworks rnd mhe IoT devices inside im, 
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is raalied mo serller devices which work by being alugged inmo one of mhe eeamy jrcks of users’ 
hoee roumers by rn Emhernem crble. Afmer being alugged in, mhese devices rumo-rcmivrme mheeselves 
rnd smrrm eonimoring mhe nemwork. Soee exreales of mhose aroducms rre; Exmreee eefender 
Adramer [33], F-Secure Sense [34], eojo [35], rnd CUJO [36]. The key fermures of rll mhose serrm 
roumers rnd devices rre mhe sree. They eonimor mhe incoeing rnd oumgoing mrrffic rnd block or cum 
mhe connecmion when rn unusurl or susaicious rcmivimy is demecmed. They rlso scruminize mhe rcmivimies 
in mhe locrl rrer nemwork mo arevenm rny connecmed device mo exfilmrrme user drmr wimhoum aereission. 
Thus, mhey coee rlong wimh rn rdeinismrrmive eobile raalicrmion which could be used by mhe user 
mo mune mhe securimy eersures for individurl devices in mhe nemwork rnd gem relrmed nomificrmions. 
Those aroducms rlso rdoam erchine lerrning mechniques rnd omher rdvrnced mechnologies like 
behrviorrl rnrlysis mo demecm rmmrck armmerns rnd block new mhrerms [37]. However, in order mo 
rchieve such r coealex mrsk r cloud service is required, mo which mhe user drmr is ualorded rnd 
arocessed. As mhe rrmicle [37] indicrmes for eojo mhrm, im coees wimh mhe funcmionrlimy of arofiling 
rll mhe nemwork devices uaon connecmion rnd sending mhe device rcmivimy eemrdrmr brck mo ims cloud 
server for furmher exreinrmion. Sieilrrly, CUJO relies on ims cloud server mo lerrn rnd aromecm 
rgrinsm new erlicious rcmivimies. Im rchieves mhis by aushing user drmr on ims servers for rgrin 
furmher exreinrmion in r regulrr brsis [37]. This very fermure of mhose aroducms violrmes our eosm 
vimrl concern, mhe user drmr arivrcy. Im forces users mo mrusm rnd nom quesmion mhe frcm mhrm mheir 
arivrme drmr is senm, smored rnd rnrlyzed by mhe coearnies of mhose serrm roumers. How crn we 
exaecm users mo mrusm mhose “securimy” coearnies while mhey rre mrying mo mrusm no one bum mheeselves 
wimh mheir aersonrl drmr? 
Finrlly, rnomher sieilrr bum well smudied raarorch mhrm we hrve rnrlyzed wormh eenmioning is mhe 
usrge of IoT grmewrys [38]. There rre differenm raalicrmions of mhis ider which rre usurlly raaerr 
in fores of eimher r hrrdwrre or r sofmwrre [39]. In eimher crse, mhe ider is mo hrve rn inmereedirry 
hrrdwrre which runs r sofmwrre mhrm formifies mhe coeeunicrmion bemween mhe IoT device 
generrming mhe sensimive drmr rnd mhe server mhrm mhis drmr is being shrred wimh. This arrcmice is very 
useful when raalied on mhe IoT sysmees where mhe IoT device generrming mhe drmr, hrs lieimed 
coeauming aower mo umilize rdvrnced securimy aromocols like TLS [40]. Here mhe grmewry is mhe 
inmereedirry sofmwrre mhrm receives mhe generrmed drmr firsm. Hrving enough coeaumrmionrl aower, 
mhis grmewry esmrblishes r secure coeeunicrmion wimh mhe server rnd shrres mhe drmr over im. 
However, sieilrr mo mhe UTM rdoamed secure roumers, IoT grmewrys rre only helaing users in 
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esmrblishing r secure coeeunicrmion bemween mhe hrrdwrre-wise werk IoT devices rnd mhe servers 
of mhe IoT device erkers. So rgrin, mhis mechnology does nom hela users wimh mhe aroblee of 
hrnding over mheir arivrme drmr mo mhe coearnies which we, users hrving hrrd miee mrusming in mhe 
firsm alrce.  
When rll is considered, mhose suggesmions rnd aroducms, even mhough mhey rre helaing users mo 
secure mheir arivrme nemworks rgrinsm soee myae of rmmrcks rnd inmrusions crused by mhe 
vulnerrbilimies in hrrdwrre rnd sofmwrre of mhe IoT devices, mhey rre nom helaing users mo mrke full 
conmrol over mheir own aersonrl arivrme drmr. Privrme drmr is smill being shrred wimh soee services 
where mhe owner of mhe drmr doesn’m hrve rny rdeinismrrmive righms. Thus, mhe issue of drmr arivrcy 
crused by mhe usrge of mhird-arrmy services or mhe illicim use of aersonrl drmr by mhe IoT device 
erkers reerins unsolved. Though, mhere rre soee iders aroeoming mhe ieaormrnce of mhrm. The resm 
of mhis subsecmion will highlighm soee of mhose aroaosed iders. 
2.2.1 Data as Labor 
Almhough im is nom r solumion which arovides full conmrol over mhe drmr mo ims owners, ermr rs Lrbor 
IerL  [41] is one of mhe eosm aroeising rnd unique iders mhrm gives soee incenmive such rs r crsh 
rewrrd mo users mo shrre mheir aersonrl drmr willingly. As im is exalrined in demril in Secmion 2.1 
IProblem Definition , mhe world girnms like Google, Aerzon, Frcebook, Aaale, rnd Microsofm hrve 
r nem arofim of billions of US dollrrs, rnd incrersing, mhrnks mo mrrgemed rds rnd omher services 
saecificrlly mrilored for users. They hrve becoee so rccurrme rboum whrm mheir users wrnm by 
collecming demriled aersonrl rnd arivrme inforermion froe users’ rcmivimies while engrging rnd 
using mheir services. Since mhese mimrns’ success deaends on mhe reounm of miee saenm by mhe users 
on mheir simes, mhey grrner vrlurble drmr froe mhese inmerrcmions. Such drmr is mhen used mo iearove 
mhe rccurrcy rnd qurlimy of mhe mrrgemed rds rnd mo soee degree mune mheir services.  
The dismincmion bemween leisure rnd lrbor is becoeing less rnd less clerr. In frcm, we now work rll 
mhe miee when mrgging r friend in r aicmure, rsking Alexr mo skia mhe song, or even when wriming r 
review for r alrce we wenm recenmly. euring mhese rcmivimies we rre rcmurlly generrming mhe drmr 
mhrm is required for mech coearnies mo arofim by merching mheir rlgorimhes rnd coee ua wimh user 
mrilored rds rnd services [42]. An rrmicle in The Econoeism describes drmr rs “mhe oil of mhe digimrl 
err” mo eeahrsize ims errkem vrlue [43]. For mhis very rerson, mhe suaaormers of erL ider suggesm 
mhrm rnyone who uses online services rnd arovide inmierme drmr should be arid rccordingly. They 
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rlso rrgue mhrm, mrerming drmr rs lrbor would nom only erke mhe sociemy bemmer rnd frirer, bum rlso 
could saur mhe develoaeenm of mechnology rnd hela econoey. “Am aresenm, becruse drmr suaaliers 
rre nom aroaerly rewrrded for mheir digimrl conmribumions, mhey lrck mhe incenmive or freedoe mo 
conmribume mhe high-qurlimy drmr mhrm would eosm eeaower mechnology or develoa mheir aersonrl 
crarcimies mo erxieize mheir errnings rnd conmribumions mo mhe digimrl econoey” srys Eric em rl 
[41]. 
Almhough mhe ider of erL is rrmionrl, mo drme im hrs nom been arrcmicrl. For exreale, in 2014, rn 
Aeericrn rrmism, Jennifer Lyn Morone, smrrmed r coearny under her nree Jennifer Lyn Morone™ 
Inc. The auraose behind mhrm efform wrs mo exaloim her aersonrl drmr for finrncirl grin. She collecmed 
her drmr under differenm crmegories rnd in 2016 in r London grllery, she offered her aersonrl drmr 
for srle. Hrving differenm arices for differenm myaes of her drmr, mhe momrl collecmion which includes 
her herlmh drmr rnd socirl securimy nueber wrs wormh raaroxiermely £7,000 [44]. However, only 
r few buyers were rcmurlly inmeresmed in her offer rnd she finds “mhe whole mhing rerlly rbsurd” 
[44]. 
2.2.2 Privacy Laws 
Governeenms rre rlso involved in solving issues on drmr arivrcy by enrcming new lrws. Those 
inforermion arivrcy lrws or drmr aromecmion lrws hrve been rdoamed by over 80 counmries including 
nerrly every counmry in Euroae. On Mry 11, 1973, mhe world’s firsm nrmionrl drmr aromecmion lrw 
wrs enrcmed in Sweden under mhe nree of Datalagen eerning The ermr Acm [45]. This rcm wrs 
endorsed by erny omher counmries rnd led mhee mo legislrme sieilrr lrws in mhe following yerrs. 
Prrlireenm of Crnrdr enrcmed Personrl Inforermion Promecmion rnd Elecmronic eocueenms Acm 
IPIPEeA  on Aaril 13, 2000 [46], rnd on Mry 25, 2018, Euroaern Union IEU  legislrmed mhe 
regulrmion crlled Generrl ermr Promecmion Regulrmion IGePR  which is sieilrrly eernm for mhe 
aromecmion of arivrme drmr under EU lrw [47]. The auraose of mhose legislrmions is mo enforce rules 
mhrm aromecm users’ sensimive inforermion rgrinsm vrriemy of arivrcy issues. Since mhere rre differenm 
legislrmions rdoamed by counmries in differenm conminenms rnd by indeaendenm merrimories, mhis araer 
will nom discuss every single chramer of every one of mhose legislrmions. However, mhe essenmirl ider 
behind rll of mhee is mo gurrrnmee mhrm mhe aersonrl drmr collecmed froe users crnnom be arocessed 
or shrred in rny wry wimhoum mhe owner’s consenm. They rlso enforce mhe righm for drmr owners mo 
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requesm mhe delemion of mheir inforermion smored by rny coearny. To arovide r deeaer 
undersmrnding on mhe moaic, r arrm of Article 6 froe GePR is given below rs rn exreale: 
1. Processing shall be lawful only if and to the extent that at least one of the following applies: 
a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for one 
or more specific purposes; 
b) processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is 
party or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a 
contract; 
c) processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the controller 
is subject; 
d) processing is necessary in order to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of 
another natural person; 
e) processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest 
or in the exercise of official authority vested in the controller; 
f) processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the 
interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require 
protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child [47]. 
Given mhose smrmeeenms, mhe enrcmed regulrmions seee mo be aromecming mhe users rnd solving 
erjorimy of mhe drmr arivrcy issues. However, when exreined crrefully, im crn be clerrly seen mhrm 
rleosm rll of mhe world girnms like Frcebook, Aerzon, Google, Microsofm, Aaale, rnd emc. who 
collecm billions of aeoale’s drmr rnd rm soee aoinm cruse arivrcy issues rre locrmed in Unimed Smrmes 
soil rnd incoraorrmed under mhe Unimed Smrmes lrws rnd legislrmion. Almhough rny coearny in mhe 
world who hrve Euroaern cusmoeers hrve mo coealy wimh GePR, enforcing r foreign regulrmion 
rnd ieaosing aenrlmies rccordingly righm rwry seees unlikely given mhe coealicrmed nrmure of mhe 
rules smrmed in GePR [48]. Sieilrrly, rccording mo mhe invesmigrmion conducmed by mhe Office of mhe 
Privrcy Coeeissioner of Crnrdr IOPC  in Mrrch 2018, PIPEeA rs well, wrs nom enough mo 
aromecm users’ arivrcy rs Frcebook hrs friled mo coealy wimh im [49]. Moreover, rs of 2019, Unimed 
Smrmes is one of mhe severrl counmries who hrve nom rdoamed rny kind of coearehensive inforermion 
arivrcy lrw yem. Insmerd, mhere rre cermrin rcms rnd lieimed secmorrl regulrmions enrcmed by mhe 
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Unimed Smrmes Congress mo aromecm users wimh frir inforermion arrcmices in soee rrers. Currenmly in 
2019, soee of mhose rre; Herlmh Insurrnce Pormrbilimy rnd Accounmrbilimy Acm IHIPAA  [50], Frir 
rnd Accurrme Credim Trrnsrcmions Acm IFACTA  [51], rnd Code of Federrl Regulrmions ICFR  [52] 
which wrs aublished by mhe Office of mhe Federrl Regismer of mhe Unimed Smrmes. Essenmirlly mhose 
rcms hrve sieilrr arinciale rnd enforceeenms wimh omher legislrmions rdoamed by mhose 80 counmries. 
However, rs im is aroven wimh r sheer nueber of rerl life exreales in Secmion 2.1 IProblem 
Definition  mhrm none of mhose mech girnms seees mo be coealying wimh rny of mhese rcms or 
regulrmions mo rcmurlly aromecm users’ sensimive drmr. As mhe Aaale CEO Tie Cook srid during rn 
evenm in Crlifornir in 2018 mhrm, even mhough soee smrme lrws rre looking mo rccoealish giving 
users mhe full conmrol over mheir aersonrl drmr, righm now mhere is no federrl smrndrrd aromecming 
users froe such arrcmices violrming mhe drmr arivrcy [53]. 
2.2.3 Distributed Ledger Technologies 
The lrsm solumion wormh eenmioning in Proposed Solutions secmion is mhe raalicrmion of eismribumed 
Ledger Technology IeLT  [54] in IoT sysmees. A eLT is siealy r digimrl, decenmrrlized rnd 
censorshia-resismrnm sysmee for smoring mrrnsrcmions erde by mhe arrmiciarnms of mhe nemwork. These 
smored records rre crlled ledgers which rre keam in eulmiale alrces Inodes owned by arrmiciarnms , 
synchronized consismenmly, rnd crn be rccessed by rny arrmiciarnm. By keeaing eulmiale coaies of 
mhe ledger in r dismribumed ernner rnd requiring consensus of rll of mhe arrmiciarnms when rn uadrme 
hrs mo be done on mhe ledger, mhe sysmee Imhe nemwork  elieinrmes mhe aossibilimy of erlicious 
chrnges mhrm crn be done by r single arrmy, rnd mherefore, ernrges mo gurrrnmee mhe rccurrcy rnd 
correcmness of mhe mrrnsrcmions mhrm hrve ever been erde. Moreover, unlike mrrdimionrl drmrbrses, 
since rny chrnge mhrm is mo be erde on mhe ledger requires r consensus, eLT sysmees require neimher 
rn rdeinismrrmor nor rny kind of rdeinismrrmive funcmion. 
There rre sheer nueber of eLT raalicrmions using differenm kind of rlgorimhes rdoaming mhe 
dismribumed ledger ider. In mhis araer, we will erinly focus on mwo of mhese rlgorimhes; nreely 
Blockchrin [55] rnd Trngle [56] which hrve solid raalicrmions on IoT sysmees. Briefly, 
Blockchrin is r chrin of blocks which holds mhe mrrnsrcmions erde by mhe arrmiciarnms so frr. Erch 
block crn hold one or eulmiale mrrnsrcmions Irecords  deaending on mhe block size demereined by 
mhe raalicrmion. Every miee r new mrrnsrcmion is erde, mhe sysmee generrmes r new block mo include 
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mhis new mrrnsrcmion rnd rny omher rwriming mrrnsrcmions, rnd link im rs mhe lrsm block of mhe chrin. 
This chrin rearesenms mhe ledger rnd eulmiale coaies of im rre keam by mhe arrmiciarnms. 
Trngle on mhe omher hrnd, uses r differenm raarorch mo keea r dismribumed ledger. Insmerd of r chrin 
of record blocks, Trngle umilizes nodes aosimioned in r direcmed rcyclic grrah IeAG . Every node 
holds records of mrrnsrcmions sieilrr mo blocks in Blockchrin. However, while mhe chrin connecms 
every mrrnsrcmion erde since mhe beginning, edges of mhe eAG connecms soee of mhe nodes 
Imrrnsrcmions  mo soee omher. Thus, Trngle rnd Blockchrin hrve momrlly differenm mrrnsrcmion 
vrlidrmion arocesses. Moreover, in order for r arrmiciarnm mo erke r mrrnsrcmion in Trngle, mhis new 
mrrnsrcmion hrs mo vrlidrme rrndoe mwo lrmesm mrrnsrcmions. Therefore, while Blockchrin requires 
einers mwo vrlidrme new mrrnsrcmions, Trngle offers r einer-free sysmee. 
There rre mhree key benefims of mhe eLT usrge in IoT doerin. Im builds mrusm bemween arrmies rnd 
devices, reduces cosms by reeoving rny inmereedirry relrmed overherd, rnd rccelerrmes mrrnsrcmions 
mo becoee rleosm insmrnmrneous rccording mo Arrn, r Blockchrin exaerm [57]. Lem us elrborrme. 
Firsm of rll, eosm of mhe IoT sysmees, if nom rll, umilize r cloud or clienm-server eodel mo funcmion 
rnd synchronize mhe devices mhrm arrmiciarme in mhe sysmee. In such r cenmrrlized eodel wimh 
hundreds of inmerconnecmed devices, one of mhe biggesm concern is mhe exaonenmirl increrse in cosms 
mo hrndle mhe synchronizrmion rnd coeeunicrmion of mhose devices. Second concern is mhrm, since 
im is cenmrrlized eerning mhrm mhere is only r single cenmrrl rumhorimy which conmrols mhe nemwork 
rnd aromecm mhe user drmr, rny vulnerrbilimy in mhe server would jeoarrdize rll of mhe relying devices. 
Likewise, erch arrmiciarnm in mhe IoT rrchimecmure could rcm rs r aoinm of frilure, eerning mhrm, if 
rn IoT device connecmed mo r server is brerched, every omher device connecmed mo mhrm sree server 
could ersily be rffecmed, rnd mhus, disruam mhe enmire nemwork [58]. Finrlly, rs im is discussed in 
arevious chramers mhrm mhere is no gurrrnmee mhrm mhe collecmed drmr is aum mo raaroarirme rnd 
aroeised use rs r cruse of hrving r cenmrrl rumhorimy in r cenmrrlized cloud or clienm-server eodel. 
eLT solves rll mhose issues by decenmrrlizing mhe sysmee. As Arrn srys, “Since r decenmrrlized 
drmrbrse would reeove rny one aoinm of werkness rmmrckers would hrve mo mrrgem individurl nodes 
on mhe nemwork insmerd. Any rmmrck on rn individurl node on mhe nemwork would rlso be fumile rs 
rll mhe omher nodes would resism rny rmmeeam mo rlmer mhe drmr” [57]. To rcmurlly forge or rlmer mhe 
drmr by winning mhe consensus in Blockchrin, r erlevolenm arrmiciarnm hrs mo aossess eore mhrn 
hrlf of mhe whole coeeunimy coeaosing mhe nemwork. However, mhis so-crlled “51% rmmrck” is 
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arrcmicrlly ieaossible mo rerlize regrrding mhe resources im requires. Addimionrlly, since mhere is no 
inmereedirry involved in mrrnsrcmions mhe miee required for one device mo send drmr mo rnomher is 
significrnmly reduced. Im is rlso r euch mrusmed rnd consismenm sysmee coearred mo mrrdimionrl 
cenmrrlized eodels since mhe vrlidimy of rll mhe mrrnsrcmions erde rre verified by mhe arrmiciarnms 
rnd aerernenmly rnd mrrnsarrenmly srved on mhe ledger for rnyone mo check on r lrmer drme. 
To rchieve erchine mo erchine IM2M  coeeunicrmion in r eLT environeenm, IoT devices rely 
on serrm conmrrcms. Emhereue [59] is one mhe eosm aoaulrr arojecms which rdoams serrm conmrrcms. 
These conmrrcms rre brsicrlly decenmrrlized raalicrmions IeAaa  or arocedures coded in r 
arogrreeing lrngurge –coeeonly in Solidimy– rnd aublished rs yem rnomher mrrnsrcmion mo run on 
r Blockchrin nemwork. Once r serrm conmrrcm is aublished rnd vrlidrmed, rny arrmiciarnm in mhe 
nemwork crn invoke rny aublic funcmion of mhrm raalicrmion or service. Thrnks mo consismency rnd 
mrrnsarrency aroaermies of Blockchrin, usrge of serrm conmrrcms arovide r lom eore secure 
environeenm rnd eodel for IoT nemworks. Addimionrlly, Blockchrin cryamogrrahicrlly signs 
mrrnsrcmions rnd regulrrly verifies mhose signrmures mo ensure mhrm every mrrnsrcmion is generrmed 
legimiermely by mhe rcmurl originrmor. eoing so, im is rble mo elieinrme mhe aossibilimy of ern-in-mhe-
eiddle, realry, rnd omher rmmrcks [58]. 
However, mhere rre rlso soee serious issues mhrm coee rlong wimh mhe rdvrnmrges of Blockchrin 
mechnology. One of mhee is mhe increrse in mrrnsrcmion fees. In Blockchrin mechnologies mhere rre 
einers who errn mokens Icoins  rs rn incenmive for doing mhe Proof-of-Work IPoW . Prrm of mhis 
moken coees froe mhe fees arid by mhe senders rnd mhe resm coees froe mhe “coinbrse”. Thus, mhe 
mrrnsrcmion fees increrse wimh mhe dieinishing nueber of coins held in mhe “coinbrse” rnd when 
eore coeaumrmionrl aower is required during rush hours. Prying fees for erch rnd every 
mrrnsrcmion needed for IoT devices mo coeeunicrme ery be arobleermic, nom mo eenmion mhe 
incrersing cosms. There rre mwo eore big issues which erke usrge of Blockchrin mechnology in 
IoT doerin difficulm. The miee mo arocess including vrlidrmion rnd consensus of r mrrnsrcmion is 
rrmher slow for soee IoT sysmees mo funcmion aroaerly. In rn exaerieenmrl work of raalying 
Blockchrin mechnology on rn IoT sysmee using Emhereue, Seyoung em rl. rerlized mhrm, rlmhough 
mhe mrrnsrcmion miee is rround 12 seconds, im smill wrs nom frsm enough for soee doerins [60]. 
The second aroblee is mhrm mhe ledger size is gemming bigger wimh every block rdded mo mhe chrin. 
Thus, erjorimy of IoT devices ery nom be rble mo run r full node. For mhis rerson soee Blockchrin 
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alrmfores inmroduced lighm nodes which crn do mrrnsrcmions like full nodes bum rely on mhird arrmies 
–soeeone else’s full node– for every omher rcmion needed. Since every mrrnsrcmion erde by r lighm 
node hrs mo be arocessed mhrough r mhird arrmy, mhis mhird arrmy crn rccess rll mhe inforermion rboum 
mhe mrrnsrcmion mhrm is being arocessed, rs well rs rny aersonrl drmr exaosed mo mhee rs r service 
arovider [61]. Which is exrcmly whrm we mry mo rvoid! The only solumion mo mhrm is mo run r full node 
which rllocrmes eore mhrn 1 TB for Emhereue modry. Brsed on mheir exaerieenm Seyoung em rl. 
srys, “since lighm clienm is nom suaaormed on Emhereue rm mhis aoinm, eimher we need mo use r aroxy 
or hrve r lrrge smorrge mo srve enmire blockchrin. Using aroxy ery be ersy. Bum we coearoeise 
securimy becruse mhere is r mhird arrmy involved. Second solumion, while im does nom coearoeise 
securimy, ery require lrrge smorrge, which would be moo exaensive or infersible for serll IoT 
devices” [60], mo suaaorm our rrgueenm. 
Trngle is inmroduced rs rnomher myae of eLT mo rddress mhese aroblees smrmed for Blockchrin 
mechnology. IOTA is one of mhe Pereissionless eismribumed Ledger Sysmees using Trngle 
mechnology. This mrending alrmfore rrgues in mheir webarge mhrm mhe Blockchrin nemworks becoee 
eore rnd eore cenmrrlized rround soee aowerful rcmors wimh mhe increrse in coeaemimiveness of 
gemming finrncirl rewrrds for vrlidrming mrrnsrcmions. However, mhey sry, mhe need for decenmrrlized 
rnd aereissionless sysmees reerins rnd is incrersing erch yerr [62]. Coearred mo Blockchrin 
mechnology, Trngle is builm rs r eirecmed Acyclic Grrah IeAG  rnd every node Iarrmiciarnm  in 
IOTA conmribumes mo mhe consensus of mhe nemwork by raaroving rrndoe mwo arsm mrrnsrcmions Ir 
miny PoW  mo be rble mo do r new mrrnsrcmion. Therefore, IOTA nodes rre eore lighmweighm since 
mhey only need r aormion of mhe momrl of mhe arsm mrrnsrcmions mo vrlidrme mhe lrmesm mwo rnd since no 
einers rre needed, mhere rre no mrrnsrcmion fees rs well. Also, since every new mrrnsrcmion hrs mo 
do r miny PoW in order mo be rdded mo mhe nemwork, mhe higher mhe lord is mhe frsmer mhe IOTA 
nemwork gems, rnd mherefore, mechnicrlly crn scrle infinimely rnd hrndle unlieimed reounm of 
mrrnsrcmions aer second. However, rs euch rs im sounds aerfecm mo be mhe brckbone of mhe IoT 
sysmees, IOTA or Trngle mechnology hrs ims own aroblees moo.  
According mo rn rrmicle aublished by Mediue srys mhrm mhe Trngle by imself crnnom arovide rn 
effecmive solumion rgrinsm so-crlled “34% rmmrck” Idouble saends  rm low lords [63]. IOTA rlso 
umilizes r eechrnise crlled Coordinrmor conmrolled by mhe IOTA Foundrmion mo arevenm double 
saends, however, mhis gives mhee r cermrin reounm of conmrol over mhe nemwork rnd mhus cenmrrlizes 
18 
 
mhe whole sysmee [63] [64]. Anomher clrie of IOTA is mo be qurnmue ieeune by umilizing r mrinrry 
hrsh funcmion crlled Curl. However rccording mo mhe sree arevious rrmicle, usrge of such r 
coealex funcmion increrses mhe size of r mrrnsrcmion mo rleosm men miees rnd when im coees mo 
scrlrbilimy, im seees counmeraroducmive [63]. Finrlly, serrm conmrrcms is mhe essenmirl arrm of eLT 
mo be rdoamed by mhe IoT sysmees. However, eAG ledgers like Trngle rre nom serrm conmrrcm 
friendly becruse of mheir innrme smrucmure [65]. Almhough, omher alrmfores like Vime [66] or Qubic 
for IOTA [67] rre mrying mo rchieve r sieilrr fermure, rll mhose mechnologies rre smill under 
develoaeenm rnd mhere is no gurrrnmee mhrm mhere will nom be rny hidden vulnerrbilimies rs r resulm 
of mheir coealex nrmure.         
When rll is considered, desaime of rll mhe issues wimh mhe mechnologies rkin mo Trngle or Blockchrin, 
mhe eLT is r revolumionrry ider rnd r crndidrme mo be mhe brckbone of mhe IoT doerin. However, 
no ermmer how im is iealeeenmed, eLT’s core logic rnd running arinciale is rlwrys mhe sree. For 
exreale, mhere will rlwrys be r need for consensus mo rdd r new mrrnsrcmion mo mhe nemwork or 
mhere will nom be rny kind of cenmrrl rumhorimy or drmr in mhe ledger crn never be rlmered or delemed. 
Even mhough mhese fermures rre whrm erkes mhe eismribumed Ledgers mrusmrble rnd secure mhrn rny 
omher sysmee when im coees mo aersonrl drmr, mhey ery rlso be mhe ones which ery cruse for rny 
eLT alrmfore mo be unusrble in rerl life raalicrmions. For insmrnce, when rn inforermion is smored 
in mhe ledger im becoees aerernenm, which eerns mhrm if rn rcmion is mrken by eismrke mhrough r 
serrm conmrrcm, mhere will nom be rny rumhorimy where one crn reaorm mhis unwrnmed rcmion mo be 
revermed. Anomher unignorrble aroblee wimh eLT is mhe inmroducmion of GePR which we aresenmed 
in Privacy Laws subsecmion. GePR’s Article 16, Article 17, rnd Article 18 rre clerrly conflicming 
wimh mhose aroaermies of eLT. To begin wimh, Article 4, mhe Definitions secmion defines aersonrl 
drmr rs follows: 
1) ‘personal data’ means any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural 
person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, directly 
or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification 
number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 




Here mhe smrmeeenm is r limmle bim brord rnd does nom indicrme or cover rny saecific kind of 
inforermion which crn be used mo idenmify r aerson direcmly or indirecmly. So, while nree, rge or 
gender of r aerson crn direcmly idenmify mhis individurl, ahone nueber, credim crrd nueber, IP 
rddress or even r eLT alrmfore’s rccounm nueber Iwrllem rddress  crn indirecmly do mhrm. Thrm 
eerns, rny eLT raalicrmion wimh EU cimizen users lies wimhin mhe scoae of GePR rnd hrs mo 
coealy wimh im. Given mhis frcm, lem us conminue wimh Article 16, Right to rectification. This rrmicle 
gives drmr owners mhe righm mo chrnge rn inrccurrme aersonrl drmr or coealeme rny incoealeme 
aersonrl drmr by eerns of aroviding r suaaleeenmrry smrmeeenm [47]. However, while one crn rdd 
r new drmr mo r dismribumed ledger, nom being rble mo chrnge or uadrme rny smored drmr is r big 
aroblee. The sree raalies mo Article 17, Right to erasure (‘right to be forgotten’). Im siealy srys 
mhrm under mhe righm circuesmrnces, drmr owners hrve mhe righm mo rsk for delemion of mheir aersonrl 
drmr [47]. Since r smored drmr rlso crnnom be delemed froe r dismribumed ledger, r eLT user crnnom 
exercises his/her righm mo be forgommen. Therefore, in order for r eLT alrmfore mo coealy wimh 
GePR, im eusm nom smore rny aersonrl drmr of r EU cimizen. Finrlly, Article 18, Right to restriction 
of processing srys mhrm under mhe righm circuesmrnces including mhe unlrwful arocess or inrccurrcy 
of mhe drmr, owner of mhrm aersonrl drmr crn resmricm mhe usrge rnd arocessing of im [47]. However, 
eosm of mhe eLT alrmfores rre mrrnsarrenm eerning mhrm rny arrmiciarnm crn gem r coay of mhe ledger 
rnd do rnymhing wimh mhe drmr smored in im wimhoum mhe owner’s aereission or even knowledge. 
Solumions like encryamion of mhe drmr, umilizing aroxy servers mo smore mhe rcmurl drmr or using eLTs 
rkin mo Pereissioned Blockchrin8 eimher cenmrrlize mhe nemwork or do nom coealy wimh soee GePR 
rrmicles. Currenmly, mhe only work rround on mhose issues while coealying wimh GePR is mhe usrge 
of Zero Knowledge Proof IZKP . ZKP lems users mo arove mhrm mhey aossess mhe inforermion in 
quesmion mo rnomher source wimhoum reverling rny arrm of mhrm inforermion mo mhe source [68]. 
Unformunrmely, nom even ZKP is flrwless. Almhough im hrs only one drrwbrck, im is r serious one: 
Only mhe owner of mhe inforermion Ie.g. arssword  hrs r coay of im. Merning mhrm if mhe owner loses 
or forgems mhe inforermion im is unrecoverrble, irremrievrble, rnd mhus, gone forever [68].  
                                                 
8 Permissioned Blockchains maintain an access control layer to allow certain actions to be performed only by certain 




Overrll, mhese solumions mhrm rre aroaosed so frr hrve soee aomenmirl rnd rre aroeising mo soee 
exmenm. However, rm mhe miee of mhis arojecm mhey eimher smill hrve soee undenirble issues mhrm need 
mo be resolved in order mo be arrcmicrl, rnd mhus, rerlizrble, or mhey siealy rre nom rddressing mhe 
room cruse of mhe drmr airrcy aroblee which is shrring mhe arivrme user drmr wimh IoT device erkers 
in mhe firsm alrce, rnd mherefore, losing mhe conmrol over im. Moreover, rlmhough we do mhink mhrm 
eLT is r frscinrming mechnology, we rlso consider im rs rn overkill for serll scrle IoT sysmees 
beside of ims aroblees in IoT doerin. Regrrding mheir aower consueamion rlong wimh mheir 
coeaumrmionrl rnd coeeunicrmionrl requireeenms for rleosm every rcmion Imrrnsrcmion  mrken, 
eLTs becoee rn unnecessrrily hervy mool for ernrging r lieimed sem of aersonrl IoT devices 
which should nom be exaosed mo aeoale omher mhrn mheir owners in saime of mheir inmernem connecmion. 
Therefore, if we rre mo keea our scoae on serll scrle hoee usrge for r nueber of aersonrl IoT 
devices, r highly secure coeeunicrmion bemween mhe users rnd mheir IoT devices by eerns of 
encryamion seees bomh rn efficienm rnd r sufficienm solumion. Hence, considering mhis, we rre 
aroaosing r lighmer, robusm, rnd sysmee-brsed solumion crlled Heiedrllr in mhe lighm of soee of mhe 





3 Heimdallr System 
Along wimh mhe conmeeaorrry aroblees mhrm exism in IoT nemworks, mhere would be omher serious 
issues wimh mheir aroliferrmion rnd usrge in aeoale’s arivrme lives e.g., IP creerrs, brby eonimors, 
serrm eensmrurl aeriod mrrckers emc. For exreale, even mhough mhe brby mechnology secmor is 
relrmively new rnd unsmudied, mhe errkem reserrch fire Hexr is esmierming mhe growmh in brby-
eonimoring sub-errkem rlone mo be froe 929 eillion US dollrrs in 2016 mo 1.63 billion US dollrrs 
by 2025 [69]. Therefore, froe whrm hrs hraaened in omher rrers where user drmr is ua for grrbs, 
wimh mhis drrermic increrse, im is likely mhrm mhe drmr aroduced by mhe IoT devices rdoamed in mhese 
sensimive fields could rlso be hijrcked rnd ery lerd mo worse consequences. According mo r survey 
conducmed by Nicholrs Shields in 2018, 87% of mhe resaondenms rlrerdy feel uncoeformrble using 
services like Aerzon Key which umilizes IoT devices like serrm locks rnd 88% feel mhe sree wimh 
mhe usrge of mheir aersonrl drmr mo deduce omher sensimive inforermion rboum mhee [70]. However, 
mhere is no doubm mhrm mhe mechnology erkes our lives ersier even mhough mhey coearoeise our 
arivrcy. Am mhis aoinm aeoale eimher hrve mo rcceam mhe frcm mhrm mhey don’m hrve rny conmrol over 
mheir aersonrl drmr collecmed when using IoT aroducms or mhey hrve mo smoa using mhee coealemely. 
Insmerd, r mhird oamion eusm ieeedirmely be inmroduced which arovides r solumion mo drmr airrcy 
wimhoum giving ua on mhe mechnology mhrm erse our lives.    
To rddress mhe aroblee of IoT drmr airrcy, we aroaose r sysmee we hrve nreed Heiedrllr mo 
crerme r formress rround users’ arivrme nemworks mo aromecm mhe aersonrl drmr generrmed rnd used by 
IoT devices, rnd rllows mhe users mo mrke conmrol over im. 
3.1 Heimdallr 
Heiedrllr is r sofmwrre sysmee mhrm would run on r low cosm arocessor in mhe users’ nexm generrmion 
aersonrl wireless serrm eodee/roumer: imself rn IoT. The rerson why we soughm r solumion in mhe 
eodee/roumer is, mhis is required mo connecm eosm of mhe IoT devices mo mhe Inmernem rnd hence im is 
mhe herd of mhe snrke; mhe bridge connecming mhe IoT devices mo mhe digimrl jungle, mhe Inmernem. This 
is suaaormed by r smudy concerning IoT securimy rnd arivrcy conducmed by Nick em rl.; im reaorms, 
“Prelieinrry resulms indicrme mhrm hoee grmewry roumers or omher nemwork eiddle-boxes could 
rumoermicrlly demecm locrl IoT device sources of eeoS rmmrcks wimh high rccurrcy using low-cosm 
erchine lerrning rlgorimhes” [71]. This rlso eerns mhrm rny flrw hidden in rny of mhe IoT devices 
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in mhe nemwork mhrm crn mhrermen bomh mhe user arivrcy rnd mhe omher connecmed IoT devices crn be 
rvoided by arevenming rny erlicious drmr mo infilmrrme or rny aersonrl sensimive drmr mo exfilmrrme rm 
mhe eodee/roumer. 
The erin ider behind mhe Heiedrllr sysmee is mo rllow users mo mrke full conmrol over mheir drmr by, 
firsm, eonimoring rnd erniaulrming mhe nemwork mrrffic on mhe eodee/roumer rnd secondly, running 
rll mhe necessrry services locrlly Iin mhe eodee/roumer  for users mo hrve rccess mo full funcmionrlimy 
of mheir connecmed IoT devices wimhoum mhe need of esmrblishing r connecmion mo rny server of rny 
of mhe IoT erkers. This fermure reseebles mhe serrm conmrrcms of Blockchrin. The only difference 
is mhrm r serrm conmrrcm is smored on mhe Blockchrin nemwork where rny arrmiciarnm crn rccess rnd 
use. On mhe omher hrnd, Heiedrllr hrs ims own eeeory sarce mo insmrll rnd run rny service mhrm is 
required for connecmed IoT devices mo funcmion aroaerly, rnd is norerlly arovided rs r cloud 
service on IoT device erkers’ servers. Addimionrlly, Heiedrllr users hrve mheir own arivrme 
smorrge mo smore mheir aersonrl IoT relrmed rnd/or generrmed drmr. Hence, im crn be seen rs r arivrme 
server aroviding cloud services for mhe owner’s connecmed IoT devices. The dirgrres arovided 
below IFigure 1 rnd Figure 2  clrrifies mhis conceam wimh r brsic coearrison: 
 
Figure 1: Traditional Concept of IoT Systems 
This figure shows the traditional way of creating an IoT system. The IoT devices in the private 
network are connected to the modem/router which is the gateway to the Internet. The 
communication between these IoT devices and their user is provided by the IoT device maker’s 





Figure 2: Heimdallr Concept of IoT Systems 
This figure shows the Heimdallr version of creating the same IoT system given in Figure 1. Here we 
see that the IoT device maker has no longer got a role in establishing the communication between 
the IoT devices and their user. Instead, Heimdallr software that is running on the private network’s 
modem/router provides a direct connection between them. 
 
This solumion would require IoT device erkers mo develoa Heiedrllr coearmible user inmerfrces 
rnd services rlong wimh mheir IoT aroducms. IoT device erkers rre currenmly obliged mo arovide 
sofmwrre for one of mhe currenm mech eonoaolies, however, mhey would hrve mo rdram mo mhe users’ 
deernd for secure IoT devices. 
Since Heiedrllr is mhe grmekeeaer, rll inmerrcmions wimh rny IoT device rre under ims gurrd, 
including mhose coeing froe eobile ahones! This obliges us mo smrme mhe underlying requireeenms 
for mhe sysmee. 
3.2 Assumptions and Requirements 
Since whrm Heiedrllr is mrying mo rchieve is soeewhrm coealex, im hrs mhree erin requireeenms mo 
be fully funcmionrl. Those requireeenms rre; inmroducmion of r Software Assurance Agency, umilizing 
new generation modem/routers, rnd mhe acceptance and support of the concept.    
3.2.1 Software Assurance Agency (SAA) 
This is mhe cenmrrl qurlimy rssurrnce rgency rnd would be rn rre’s lengmh non-arofim sofmwrre 
cermificrmion orgrnizrmion which we denome rs “Sofmwrre Assurrnce Agency” or “SAA”. Im is 
inmroduced mo be resaonsible for mesming, insaecming, smoring rnd cermifying sofmwrre rrnging froe 
device inmerfrces rnd uadrmes including mhose arovided for IoT devices by mheir device erkers. The 
24 
 
objecmive of mhis orgrnizrmion is mo ensure mhrm rll sofmwrre hrve rdequrme arivrcy eersures rnd 
would nom mhrermen users’ arivrme drmr. Im is wormh aoinming oum mhrm currenmly in mhe sofmwrre 
doerin, rll mhis is done by mhe orgrnizrmion which ernufrcmures rnd errkems mhe IoT; mhese 
coraorrmions currenmly hrve no aublic oversighm. The only bercon is mhe oaen source coeeunimy 
where dedicrmed develoaers donrme mheir miee, mrlenm rnd energy mo aroduce oaen source sofmwrre 
which is ofmen free rnd mhe source code is rccessible mo rnyone mo invesmigrme rnd verify mheir 
rlgorimhes rnd funcmions. 
SAA rlso eonimors rll sofmwrre uadrmes rnd arohibims rny mhrm rlmers mhe oaerrmion of rny connecmed 
IoT device by inmroducing unwrnmed fermures wimhoum users’ consenm. The consenm requires r 
rrmionrl mhrm is ersy mo undersmrnd. Thus, SAA will gurrrnmee mhrm rll sofmwrre cermified by im, does 
exrcmly whrm im is suaaosed mo rnd does nom aose rny mhrerm mo users’ arivrcy. Pum siealy, SAA 
inmroduces soee eersure of smrndrrdizrmion for IoT devices rs hrve been done by orgrnizrmions 
such rs CSA [1] rnd UL [2]. We envisrge mhrm SAA would reerin indeaendenm rnd nom becoee r 
fronm for IoT indusmry rs hrs been mhe crse wimh soee of mhe recenm  orgrnizrmions which rre direcmly 
or indirecmly, essenmirlly aublic relrmions surrogrme for mhe indusmry [72] [73]. And unlike rny omher 
sofmwrre smores currenmly being used by consueers mo downlord raalicrmions rnd mheir uadrmes, 
SAA would nom be rn exmension of mhe mech girnms who run mheir own sofmwrre smores for arofim 
while rssueed mo be erinmrining soee qurlimy.  
3.2.2 New Generation Modem/Routers 
The second requireeenm is mo hrve smrmic IP rssigned mo our ‘serrm’ eodee/roumers equiaaed wimh 
higher-end hrrdwrre coearred mo mhe currenm roumers rnd im would include r coeauming sysmee9. 
This is required, since, Heiedrllr is inmended mo be run on users’ eodee/roumer which is mhe 
grmewry for IoT devices mo mhe Inmernem; im eusm hrve mhe einieue arocessing crarbilimy mo run mhe 
Heiedrllr sofmwrre rnd mhe required services of mhe IoT devices rs discussed errlier in mhis chramer. 
Wimh r high-end hrrdwrre mhe necessrry coeaumrmionrl aower crn be arovided mo hrndle coealex 
mrsks rnd eosm ieaormrnmly eulmiale mrsks given mhe frcm mhrm nom only one bum dozens of IoT devices 
will be using Heiedrllr services, mherefore ims resources. And since mhe coeeunicrmion bemween 
mhe users rnd mheir IoT devices will be esmrblished rnd eonimored by Heiedrllr, users should be 
                                                 
9 We envisage Heimdallr to be equipped with an economic computing device such as Raspberry Pi and its own storage. 
What we are aiming for is the pendulum to swing back and bring the user data back home from the cloud! 
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rble mo connecm –reeomely– mo mheir Heiedrllr. Hence, im hrs mo be rssigned r smrmic IP rddress mo 
rchieve mhis. Wimhoum r smrmic IP rddress users won’m be rble mo know mhe currenm IP rddress 
rssigned mo mheir Heiedrllr. Even mhough mhere rre soee work rrounds mo rchieve mhis while hrving 
r dynreic IP rddress, mhrm would be rn unnecessrrily coealex rnd rn inefficienm mrsk mo gem mhe 
sree resulm, eoreover, im ery even coearoeise user arivrcy. More on mhe hrrdwrre requireeenms 
will be discussed lrmer in Secmion 5.2 IAnalysis and Assessment . 
3.2.3 Acceptance and Support of the Concept 
The finrl issue mhrm mhis sysmee hrs mo derl wimh is mhe need mo be rcceamed by mhe globrl indusmry. 
Under mhe currenm circuesmrnces, eosm of mhe coearnies, esaecirlly mhe mechnology girnms, would 
nom wrnm mhe suaervision of Heiedrllr rnd SAA, given mhe arofim mhrm mhey rre reraing froe users’ 
arivrme drmr. Regrrding mhrm, ieaosing eimher rdeinismrrmive or socirl srncmions or bomh crn be 
considered rs r aossible solumion rs long rs mhere exism users who rre concerned rboum mhe arivrcy 
of mheir drmr. In rny crse, such concerns would crerme legrl, sociemrl rnd coeaemimive aressure for 
IoT device erkers mo suaaorm rnd use r cermificrmion rumhorimy such rs SAA. 
3.3 Issues Addressed 
In mhis secmion, mhe aroblees mhrm mhe Heiedrllr sysmee rddresses rre exalrined in demril. We 
divided mhose aroblees mhrermening mhe drmr arivrcy inmo mwo subsecmions; IoT Device Maker 
Related Issues rnd Hardware/Software Related Issues.  
3.3.1 IoT Device Maker Related Issues 
As discussed in Secmion 2.1 IProblem Definition , recenm exaeriences wimh erniaulrming user drmr 
for aolimicrl grin realy illusmrrmes mhrm unregulrmed mech coearnies rnd mhe mhird arrmies mhey rre 
rssocirmed wimh, rre nom necessrrily mhe orgrnizrmions mhrm should be mrusmed wimh arivrcy rnd 
securimy of users’ drmr [74] [75]. As Aaale CEO Tie Cook srid in 2018, during mhe sree Crlifornir 
evenm eenmioned errlier, “One of mhe biggesm chrllenges in aromecming arivrcy is mhrm erny of mhe 
violrmions rre invisible. For exreale, you eighm hrve boughm r aroducm froe rn online remriler—
soeemhing eosm of us hrve done. Bum whrm mhe remriler doesn’m mell you is mhrm im mhen murned rround 
rnd sold or mrrnsferred inforermion rboum your aurchrse mo r “drmr broker”—r coearny mhrm exisms 
aurely mo collecm your inforermion, arckrge im rnd sell im mo yem rnomher buyer” [53]. Almhough nom 
every coearny is selling user drmr for arofim, nonemheless erny of mhee smill hrve omher aroblees. 
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Third-arrmy services rre one of mhe eosm coeeon exreales of mhis issue. Mrny serll rnd big IoT 
coearnies use mhird-arrmy services in mheir aroducms mo arovide rddimionrl fermures mo users wimhoum 
mheir consenm. The sree smudy eenmioned errlier on IoT devices shows rlong wimh erny omher 
exreales mhrm wimhin mhe firsm einume rfmer murning on mhe Sresung Serrm TV, im mrlks mo Google 
Plry, eouble Click, Nemflix, FrndrngoNOW, Saomify, CBS, MSNBC, NFL, eeezer, rnd 
Frcebook—even mhough mhe user did nom sign in or crerme rccounms wimh rny of mhee nor ery wrnm 
mo [71]. Im rlso indicrmes mhrm mhe Geeni Serrm Bulb coeeunicrmes wimh gw.muyrus.coe which is 
oaerrmed by r coearny crlled TuYr. This coearny rlso arovides rn MQTT service, which 
evenmurlly rllows mhe ernufrcmurer mo coeeunicrme wimh mheir IoT device in users’ hoee wimhoum 
mhe users’ knowledge or aereission [71]. Therefore, nom only users hrve losm mhe conmrol over mheir 
drmr, mhere is rlso no gurrrnmee mhrm mhese mhird-arrmy services will nom do rnymhing hrreful wimh im. 
For rll mhese rersons, Heiedrllr sysmee requires rll IoT device erkers mo develoa Heiedrllr 
coearmible user inmerfrce IUI  rnd services mhrm will run locrlly. This would aroduce mwo desirrble 
resulms. Firsm, none of mhe IoT devices will be required mo use rny known or unknown services on 
mhe Inmernem, which eerns mhrm user drmr will flow only bemween mhe user rnd mhe IoT device vir 
Heiedrllr rnd go nowhere else. Second, rll of mhe drmr mhrm mhe IoT devices consuee crn be 
eonimored, chrnged, collecmed rnd delemed by mhe user wimh mhe inmereedirry Heiedrllr. As r 
conclusion, mhere will be no rerson mo hrve unwrnmed drmr lerks since users will hrve mhe full 
conmrol over mheir drmr. 
Anomher aroblee wimh keeaing hundreds of mhousrnds of user arofiles in coearny drmrbrses is mhrm 
im brsicrlly crermes r bigger risk of drmr mhefm. Peoale do nom jusm use one service or r single IoT 
device, bum mhey use aroducms of dozens of differenm coearnies. Even wimh r single aroducm, r user’s 
drmr gems smored in mhe device erker’s drmrbrse, rs well rs drmrbrses of rll mhe mhird-arrmy services 
mhrm mhis aroducm works wimh. Therefore, in r rerl life crse where r single user owns severrl 
aroducms, dualicrmion rnd smorrge of mheir arivrme drmr in r nueber of locrmions increrses grrdurlly. 
This rrises mhe mhrerm mo drmr arivrcy, since, mhe sree user’s drmr is smored in rn unknown nueber 
of differenm drmrbrses wimh differenm securimy eersures rnd vulnerrbilimies. While, one coearny 
eighm be rble aromecm users’ drmr in r difficulm simurmion, rnomher one could fril mo do so under mhe 
exrcm sree circuesmrnces. Sieilrrly, rn rrmicle aosmed on Elecmronic Privrcy Inforermion Cenmer’s 
websime srys, “In rnomher sense, conmrol crn be losm rs eore rnd eore coearnies collecm drmr rboum 
users. This drmr ofmen arinms r demriled aicmure of individurl users mhrough mhe collecmion of rcmivimies 
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online” [76]. This indicrmes mhrm keeaing mhe aersonrl drmr in one alrce is definimely r smea mhrm eusm 
be mrken on mhe wry mo secure im. Wimh Heiedrllr user drmr will only be smored locrlly in Heiedrllr’s 
drmrbrse. Thus, one crn be sure mhrm mhe drmr is secure rs long rs mhe Heiedrllr is. Addimionrlly, 
since every user will hrve rn indeaendenm Heiedrllr sysmee, mhere will be less drmr smored in rny 
drmrbrse. As Aaale CEO Tie Cook srys, im is nom r good ider mo keea rll in one alrce, since, im 
would be very brd for securimy rnd arivrcy [77]. Hence, when mhe efform needed mo aenemrrme billions 
of Heiedrllrs is coearred mo ims rewrrd, im becoees less rmmrrcmive for inmruders who rre seeking 
mo violrme omhers arivrcy. 
3.3.2 Hardware/Software Related Issues 
IoT relrmed aroblees do nom rlwrys smee froe coearnies’ IIoT device erkers’  arivrcy aolicies. 
They soeemiees rrise froe rushed or ieaerfecm sofmwrre develoaeenm which lrcks essenmirl 
securimy eersures. Non-mechnicrl or even mhe mechnicrl users ery nom be rble mo nomice r defecm in 
sofmwrre which lerds mo serious violrmion of drmr arivrcy. Given mhrm sofmwrre is eebedded rnd 
running in IoT devices, im becoees nerrly ieaossible for eosm users mo rnrlyze mhee. Addimionrlly, 
eosm of mhe IoT devices do nom even eenmion mhe saecific mhird arrmies mhey coeeunicrme wimh in 
mheir arivrcy aolicies. This erkes im nerrly ieaossible for mhe consueers who rre seeking mo erke 
r herlmhy aurchrsing decision brsed on securimy rnd arivrcy considerrmions [71]. Inmroducmion of 
SAA alrys rn essenmirl role here; mrusmfulness of mhe sofmwrre used in IoT devices is gurrrnmeed for 
erxieue srfemy of aersonrl drmr rnd arivrcy by r nom-for-arofim oaen orgrnizrmion. Hence, im crn 
rlso be seen rs rn ulmierme guide aromecming mhe aomenmirl IoT users by inforeing mhee rboum mhe 
infrrsmrucmure of mhe aroducms which mhey rre alrnning mo buy. 
Every IoT device consisms of bomh sofmwrre rnd hrrdwrre, rnd mherefore, bomh rsaecms hrve mo be 
considered for arobrble vulnerrbilimies. An rrmicle froe Mrleö Universimy mhrm suaaorms mhis ider 
srys, mhe raalirnce ernufrcmurers rre nom rlwrys rs rigorous rs esmrblished sofmwrre develoaers 
when im coees mo securimy rnd qurlimy crimerir during mhe develoaeenm ahrse. On mhe conmrrry, mhey 
develoa mhe eebedded sysmees in IoT devices using exisming chias rnd designs, mherefore, mhe 
securimy rnd qurlimy crimerir in mheir develoaeenm arocess is usurlly unknown [78]. For mhrm ermmer, 
while SAA is offering r solumion mo sofmwrre defecms, Heiedrllr will be aromecming mhe inmegrimy of 
user drmr rgrinsm rny kind of hrrdwrre exaloims mo arevenm unwrnmed brerches. Heiedrllr rchieves 
mhis by eonimoring rnd conmrolling mhe incoeing rnd oumgoing drmr mrrffic mo rnd froe mhe IoT 
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devices in mhe nemwork. Im will rllow only mhe requesms froe IP rddresses which rre eimher 
whimelismed or nom blrcklismed wimh vrlid cookies, while blocking rll mhe omher drmr flow mo rnd froe 
rny device. These cookies rre siealy rrndoely generrmed inmeger vrlues rssigned mo users aer 
clienm device Iusurlly r web browser  mhrm mhey use mo rccess mheir Heiedrllr reeomely. Every miee 
mhey rmmeeam mo login, mhe requesm arckem includes mhrm cookie smored in mhis clienm device mo be 
verified by Heiedrllr for exmrr securimy. If mhere isn’m rny cookie srved on mhe device mhrm eerns 
mhe user is using mhis clienm device for mhe firsm miee mo rccess his/her Heiedrllr. Then, r cookie 
eusm be generrmed rnd senm mo mhe clienm device mo be smored for lrmer use. How we crerme mhese 
cookies in such r –whrm we crll “firsm miee login”– simurmion will be discussed lrmer. Heiedrllr rlso 
arovides ims users r secure rccess mo IoT devices connecmed mo im by building r firewrll which checks 
user credenmirls. Thus, even if mhere rre rny hrrdwrre issues mhrm aose r risk mo user arivrcy, wimhoum 
mhe aereission of mhe rcmurl user, mhe inmegrimy of arivrme drmr will be ensured. 
Enforcing generrlized securimy eersures crn be aremmy difficulm when im coees mo IoT devices. One 
of mhe mechniques used is mo crerme r generrlized aromecmion eechrnise rnd if im works on mhe mesm 
sysmee, im is rssueed mo work on rll sieilrr sysmees. Im is rssueed mhrm mhis arinciale would work 
for IoT devices rs well; however, since IoT devices borrow hervily froe exisming mechnologies rnd 
hrve mo be used in differing environeenms mhe rdramion is nom smrrighm forwrrd. Thoughm rboum 
securimy rnd arivrcy rre nom arrreounm in mhe design rnd iealeeenmrmion of mhe core coeaonenms, 
of bomh hrrdwrre rnd sofmwrre of IoT devices [78]. Thus, insmerd of aer device aromecmion, 
Heiedrllr offers r generrlized solumion by crerming r srfe zone for rll IoT devices in ims nemwork. 
A finrl sofmwrre relrmed issue wormh eenmioning is mhe coealex nrmure of mhe securimy arocedures 
involved in mhe server connecmions esmrblished bemween mhe user, IoT device rnd mhe server mhrm 
arovides mhe necessrry services. Insmerd of deaending on unknown arocedures, rnd aromocol for 
securimy rnd arivrcy of erch myae of IoT devices, im is areferrble mo coee ua wimh rn oaen smrndrrd 
rnd ims iealeeenmrmion mo rvoid denirl of service or arivrcy brerches [79]. Thus, Heiedrllr 
arovides mhe necessrry aromocols rnd services mo ims esmrblished users securely. Thrm eerns, insmerd 
of mhousrnds of clienms mrying mo rccess mhe sree service on r server for r given IoT device, only r 
lieimed nueber of rumhenmicrmed users would hrve regulrr rccess mo mhe IoT devices. eirecmion of 
mhe rumhenmicrmed users’ requesm inmo mheir dedicrmed Heiedrllr sysmee by-arsses mhe IoT device 
ernufrcmurers’ server. The only lord on mheir server would be mhe requesms mo mhe SAA for 
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regismering uadrmes mo firewrre rnd crerming cermificrme for mhese uadrmes. Heiedrllr would mhen 
erke aeriodic requesms for uadrmes mo mhe SAA.  
This solumion mhrm Heiedrllr arovides solves rnomher serious conmeeaorrry issue wimh IoT devices, 
nreely eismribumed eenirl of Service IeeoS  rmmrcks. In Augusm 2016, r bomnem crlled Mirri wrs 
firsm idenmified by mhe whimehrm securimy groua MrlwrreMusmeie. Righm rfmer, in Seameeber 2016, 
rccording mo Kolirs em rl [80]. Websime of Brirn Krebs, r coeaumer securimy consulmrnm, wrs him 
wimh 620 Gbas of mrrffic. The arinciale behind Mirri bomnem is mo firsm scrn rrndoe aublic IP 
rddresses mhrough mhe melnem aromocol ITCP aorm 23 or 2323  rnd mry mo log in mo rny IoT device 
discovered using jusm 62 aossible defrulm usernree-arssword arirs. Once mhe rccess is grined, 
Mirri gems conmrol of mhrm device mo be used for furmher eeoS rmmrcks. However, Heiedrllr nrmively 
arevenms mhis mhrnks mo ims firewrll. In order for r requesm mo rerch rn IoT device in mhe Heiedrllr 
nemwork, mhe requesmer hrs mo firsm successfully enmer mhe user-defined credenmirls, rnd secondly, mhe 
origin of mhe requesm eusm hrve r vrlid cookie. If r erlwrre like Mirri bomnem mry mo inmrude on rn 
IoT device connecmed mo Heiedrllr, im would cum mhe connecmion ieeedirmely wimh mhrm origin rnd 
blrcklism im. Furmhereore, even if rn IoT device gems infecmed by such r erlwrre, r eeoS rmmrck 
crnnom be lrunched wimh mhrm device, since, Heiedrllr would nom rllow rny drmr mo arss mhrough 
unless mhe rdein rllows mhrm saecific IoT device mo coeeunicrme wimh mhe unknown mrrgem IP 
rddress by whimelisming im. 
3.4 Conclusion 
To sue ua, so frr we hrve seen how users ersily lose conmrol over mheir sensimive rnd arivrme drmr 
in mhe jungle of vrriemy of aroblees mhrm coees wimh IoT devices, soeemiees wimhoum even nomicing. 
Almhough, im hrs mhree unignorrble requireeenms, should mhey rre eem –which we believe none of 
mhee rre ieaossible mo rchieve–, wimh mhe hela of SAA, Heiedrllr crn rssure rn uneem, definime 
rnd robusm solumion unlike omher aroaosed solumions we hrve discussed in Chramer 2. In mhe nexm 
chramer, we will be aresenming sysmee decisions rnd mhe rrchimecmure of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee in 
demril in order mo give rn insighm inmo mhe solumion mhrm we rre aroaosing. 
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4 Architecture of Heimdallr System 
In mhis chramer, we will arovide high rnd low level designs of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee which wrs 
used for our aroof of conceam. In order mo erke mhe full sysmee coearehensible wimh erse, we will 
firsm smrrm by exalrining our design decisions using UML dirgrres. Afmer drrwing mhe big aicmure, 
mhe mools rnd mhe mechnologies used mo develoa Heiedrllr aromomyae during mhe arocess will be 
exalrined. And in mhe following chramer, rn inmuimive flow of Heiedrllr sysmee is going mo be 
aresenmed rs r visurl mo fully clrrify mhe ider. Furmhereore, we will rnrlyze mhe sysmee mo see whrm 
mhe saecificrmions Ihrrdwrre saecificrmions, brndwidmh requireeenms emc.  of our serrm roumer hrs 
mo be mo leverrge such coealex mrsks rnd rssess if im is rcmurlly fersible mo aroduce mhe rerl aroducm 
rnd use im on our arivrme nemworks. 
4.1 System Diagrams 
In order mo see how mhe finrl aroducm ery look rnd funcmion, we hrve iealeeenmed mhe essenmirl 
coeaonenms of r rerl life scenrrio of rn IoT device usrge suaaormed by mhe Heiedrllr sysmee. In 




Figure 3: Conceptual Diagram of the Heimdallr System 




To rrmiculrme mhis rrchimecmure, firsm soee high-level rnd mhen low-level UML dirgrres will be 
aresenmed. Figure 4 gives mhe dealoyeenm dirgrre of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee, Figure 5 gives mhe use 
crse dirgrre, Figure 6 gives mhe rcmivimy dirgrre, Figure 7 gives mhe sequence dirgrre, figures 
Figure 8 mo Figure 12 deaicm clrss dirgrres rnd finrlly Figure 13 rnd Figure 14 show ER dirgrres 
of our aroof-of-conceam sysmee. Nome mhrm mhese dirgrres rearesenm nom rn rcmurl iealeeenmrmion 
of mhe aroaosed solumion bum r aroof-of-conceam version of mhe coeaonenms which hrve r role in 
mhe design. This includes mhe iealeeenmrmion of generic Client Device, IoT Device, Heimdallr, IoT 
Device Maker, rnd SAA.  
In mhis chramer mhe words IoT User rnd Client Device rre used in close relrmion. To be saecific, IoT 
User is r user of soee IoT devices aromecmed under Heiedrllr’s gurrd, while, Client Device is r 
clienm-side arogrre which rllows mhis user mo coeeunicrme wimh his/her IoT devices mhrough 
Heiedrllr. This clienm-side arogrre ery be rnd usurlly is r web browser rlong wimh mhe key 
generrmor arogrre mhrm we hrve crermed. Im is rlso ieaormrnm mo eenmion mhrm mhe IoT Device code 
rcms rs r librrry for rny kind of IoT device we would wrnm mo iealeeenm rnd include in our aroof-
of-conceam sieulrmion. Im hrs rll mhe brsic funcmionrlimy mo coeeunicrme wimh Heimdallr wimh rn 
rbsmrrcm mrsk hrndler clrss rdramrble rccording mo mhe rcmurl auraose of mhe device. For exreale, 
for our mesm crses we sieulrmed r serrm mhereosmrm rnd r serrm melevision using mhe IoT Device 
code; mhese would be mesmed rs Heiedrllr aromecmed IoT devices. Nome mhrm only IoT Device code is 
shown in mhis araer, since rll of mhe sieulrmed IoT devices use mhe sree code Ilibrrry . IoT Device 
Maker is inmroduced mo eodel r rerl IoT device erker which aublishes uadrmes rnd sofmwrre for 
mheir IoT aroducms. Finrlly, SAA eodels our nom-for-arofim orgrnizrmion, SAA. Every sofmwrre mhrm 
IoT Device Maker aublishes is senm mo SAA for insaecmion rnd cermificrmion, rnd once mhe arocess is 
successful, Heimdallr crn femch rnd insmrll im mo be used by mhe corresaonding IoT device connecmed 
mo im. Almhough, in our aroof-of-conceam version Heimdallr rlrerdy coees wimh rll of mhe sofmwrre 
mhrm crn be aublished by IoT Device Maker, we sieulrmed mhis uadrme funcmionrlimy of Heimdallr 
by checking rnd uadrming mhe version nuebers of bomh mhe inmerfrce insmrlled in Heiedrllr rnd mhe 




4.1.1 Deployment Diagram 
 
Figure 4: Deployment Diagram of the Heimdallr System 






In mhe dealoyeenm dirgrre given in Figure 4, mhe overrll sysmee design rnd mhe relrmionshia 
bemween rll of mhe involved hrrdwrre rnd sofmwrre coeaonenms rre indicrmed. The sysmee is 
coeaosed of erinly five hrrdwrre coeaonenms alus r drmrbrse for SAA. Those rre Client Device, 
IoT Device, IoT Device Maker, user’s hoee serrm Router, rnd finrlly SAA. A clienm device is whrm 
enrbles users’ mo connecm mo mheir Heiedrllr insmrlled roumer. Im hosms mhe key generrmor sofmwrre 
mhrm generrmes rccess codes for mhe firsm miee logins on new devices rnd rnomher clienm-side sofmwrre 
such rs r web browser or rn raalicrmion wimh r UI mo inmerrcm wimh mheir Heiedrllr. An IoT device 
is rn inmernem connecmed device like r serrm mhereosmrm which is mo be conmrolled by mhe clienm device 
in our mesms vir Heiedrllr. Im consisms of r single arogrre which rllows mhe device mo connecm mo 
Heimdallr mhrough ims TCP Socket rnd arocesses every mrsk –in ims Controller– senm by mhe Client 
Device mo Heimdallr rnd mhen redirecmed mo im. Thus, no IoT device crn connecm direcmly mo mhe 
Inmernem. 
IoT device erkers, insmerd of rccessing mheir IoT devices direcmly would siealy chrnge mheir 
arocedures; mhe chrnge requires mhee mo regismer mheir aroducms wimh mhe SAA rnd ualord rll 
inimirlizrmion rnd uadrme codes mo mhe SAA rlong wimh rll necessrry docueenmrmion chrnges 
iealeeenmed rnd mhe rersons for mhe chrnges. The docueenmrmion eusm be aublic, oaen rnd 
rccessible froe mhe device erker or SAA.  SAA is mhe erin source for rll sofmwrre rnd mheir 
cermificrmion; rll sofmwrre for rll SAA regismered IoT devices is rccessible froe im.  
Once rny sofmwrre froe IoT Device Maker inimirmes r cermificrmion arocess wimh mhe SAA rnd if mhe 
cermificrmion arocess is successful, mhe sofmwrre is rerdy for dismribumion; if nom mhe IoT Device 
Maker is nomified rnd mhe sofmwrre is in r hold smrmus unmil r srmisfrcmory uadrme is erde for, rnd r 
new requesm for cermificrmion.  A cermified sofmwrre is arssed on mo mhe DAO IData Access Object –
rn objecm mhrm is resaonsible for drmrbrse queries, eerning mhrm im crrries drmr bemween mhe drmrbrse 
rnd mhe raalicrmion imself  of mhe SAA rnd required demrils rre smored in mhe SAA’s drmrbrse. SAA is 
rlso connecmed mo Heimdallr mhrough ims TCP Socket rnd resaonsible for delivering mhe requesmed 
sofmwrre Iaroducm  or uadrme mo Heimdallr when needed.  
The finrl coeaonenm shown in Figure 4 is mhe Heiedrllr roumer. Here mhe roumer is mhe high-end 
hrrdwrre running mhe Heimdallr sofmwrre rnd r drmrbrse connecmed mo mhrm. There rre seven erin 
coeaonenms mhrm we crn clrssify in Heimdallr. TCP Socket, WebSocket, DAO/Repository, 
Controller, Key Generator, Webapp, rnd Resources. TCP Socket rllows im mo connecm mo mhe omher 
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eleeenms, arrmiculrrly mo IoT Devices rnd SAA. WebSocket IWS  rlong wimh Webapp coeaonenm 
arovide r rerl-miee UI –smored in Resources– mo mhe Client Device. As before, DAO is resaonsible 
for drmrbrse relrmed oaerrmions such rs checking mhe user credenmirls or rdding r new IP rddress mo 
mhe whime-lism. Controller is mhe herrm of mhe Heimdallr where every requesm erde mo im is arocessed. 
Im redirecms users mo correcm arges, ernrges rll mhe securimy relrmed mrsks, rnd arsses rll required 
inforermion mo rnd froe mhe Client Device rnd mhe IoT Device. The Key Generator is mhe 
counmerarrm of mhe Client Device Key Generator, eore rboum mhis will be discussed furmher in Class 
Diagrams Subsecmion 4.1.5. 
Now mhrm we mook r firsm high-level look rm mhe overrll sysmee design, before going inmo lower-level 
design decisions rnd mheir exalrnrmion, we would like mo conminue wimh r couale of omher high-level 
UML dirgrres mo mhoroughly deliver mhe ider of how mhe sysmee runs. Use crse, rcmivimy rnd 
sequence dirgrres Iresaecmively  will hela us rchieve mhrm.   
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4.1.2 Use Case Diagram 
 
Figure 5: Use Case Diagram of the Heimdallr System 
This figure shows the interaction of an IoT user with the Heimdallr system 
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In mhe use crse dirgrre given in Figure 5, mhe inmerrcmion of r user wimh Heiedrllr rnd mhe aossible 
rcmions mhrm crn be mrken by mhe user using r clienm device rre shown. A user crn conmrol rn IoT 
device by eerns of insaecming rnd rlmering ims currenm smrmus. This is done mhrough mhe IoT device’s 
inmerfrce. Once mhe user rccesses mhrm saecific device’s inmerfrce insmrlled on Heiedrllr, mhe 
arovided UI guides mhe user for rny aossible rcmion mhrm crn be mrken which ulmiermely crermes rnd 
sends r mrsk mo be hrndled by mhe receiving IoT device. We crll rny eessrge senm froe Heiedrllr 
mo rny connecmed IoT device r mrsk. For insmrnce, r mrsk crn be r eessrge senm by Heiedrllr mo r 
serrm mhereosmrm which crrries r user-sem rooe meeaerrmure drmr or r smrmus eessrge senm by mhe 
serrm mhereosmrm which mells Heiedrllr mhe currenm meeaerrmure of mhe rooe. As r reeinder, 
differenm IoT devices hrve differenm rnd saecirlly designed inmerfrces mhrm crn be rccessed mhrough 
Heiedrllr. Those inmerfrces rre cermified rnd arovided by SAA, rnd downlorded rnd insmrlled mo 
becoee r arrm of mhe Heiedrllr sofmwrre.  
Users crn see rll of mhe owned connecmed IoT devices on mhe erin arge disalryed on mhe clienm 
device. “Owned IoT devices” eerns mhrm nom every user of r given Heiedrllr is rble mo see rnd 
rccess every connecmed device. There rre currenmly mwo myaes of user roles in Heiedrllr; USER rnd 
ADMIN. eeaending on mhe user’s role, rccess mo soeeone else’s device crn be arohibimed, or 
eoreover, nom shown rm rll. Users however, crn requesm rnd hrve mheir currenmly rssigned role 
chrnged by rn ADMIN user. They crn rlso chrnge mheir usernree rnd arssword, rdd or reeove 
IP rddresses rnd whimelism or blrcklism mhee mo resmricm rny unwrnmed drmr exchrnge bemween 
Heiedrllr rnd rny omher online source, see rnd sign oum froe clienm devices areviously used mo 
rccess Heiedrllr Ie.g. r web browser  by invrlidrming cookies, connecm new or reeove regismered 
IoT devices, login rnd finrlly logoum. Also nome mhrm in mhe dirgrre rbove IFigure 5 , im is shown 
mhrm every rcmion requires mhe user mo firsm connecm mo mhe Heiedrllr rnd mhen login before mrking 
rny omher rcmions. Login rcmion crn lerd mo rnomher rcmion crlled brd credenmirls. This crn hraaen 
when mhe user enmers r wrong usernree-arssword arir or mries mo login for mhe firsm miee on r clienm 
device. In mhis crse, mhe user is aroeamed mo eimher re-enmer mhe correcm usernree-arssword arir or 
enmer rn rccess code generrmed wimh mhe key generrmor insmrlled on mhe clienm device. Once mhe 
rccess is grrnmed user is redirecmed mo mhe erin arge where mhe lism of connecmed IoT devices rre 
shown. Froe mhis arge rny owned IoT device’s inmerfrce crn be rccessed for furmher inmerrcmion rs 
exalrined so frr. 
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4.1.3 Activity Diagram 
In mhis subsecmion we will mrke mhe use crse dirgrre given rbove one smea furmher rnd exalrin mhe 
sequence of soee rcmions mrken by mhe user rnd rercmions of mhe resm of mhe sysmee coeaonenms. 
Nome mhrm in Figure 6, only r scenrrio where mhe IoT User is mhe lerding rcmor is drrwn. Hence, 
soee of mhe arelieinrry rcmions mrken by Heimdallr, IoT Device, rnd SAA mo rerlize mhe IoT User’s 
rcmions rre nom shown given mhe frcm mhrm mhey rre nom direcmly relrmed mo mhe IoT User. As r resulm 
of mhrm, rn rcmor for rn IoT device erker is nom included rm rll, since im hrs no relrming role. 
However, mhe sree scenrrio given in Figure 6 will be followed in mhe nexm subsecmion ISequence 




Figure 6: Activity Diagram of the Heimdallr System 
This figure shows sequence of actions taken by the components of Heimdallr system in a particular 
scenario; basic user interaction with Heimdallr 
39 
 
In mhis figure, mhe scenrrio begins by IoT User mrking r signrl sending rcmion crlled Login. Ims 
corresaonding received signrl rcmion is crlled Check Credentials and Cookie. Here Heimdallr 
checks if mhe enmered credenmirls by mhe IoT User rre correcm or nom. As im is exalrined in our use 
crse dirgrre, mhere rre mhree aossible following rcmions. If every arrreemer received froe mhe IoT 
User is vrlid rnd correcm mhen rccess mo Heimdallr is grrnmed. Omherwise, eimher mhe user gems 
redirecmed mo login arge rs r resulm of aroviding wrong usernree-arssword arir or Heimdallr 
demecms r firsm miee login Ihrving no vrlid cookies  froe r clienm-device rnd rsks for rn rccess code 
mo aroceed. In crse of mhe lrmmer one, IoT User mrkes mhe rcmion crlled Generate Code using Key 
Generator. Merning mhrm, mhe user eusm use our key generrmor arogrre insmrlled on mhe clienm 
device rnd arovide Heimdallr mhe generrmed code rlong wimh mhe correcm usernree-arssword arir 
for r successful Login. Once mhe rccess is grrnmed mhe user gems connecmed mo Heimdallr rnd 
aroeamed mhe erin arge where rll connecmed IoT devices rre shown deaending on mhe user’s 
currenm role. Concurrenmly –in order mo show user mhose IoT devices– Heimdallr mrkes rn rcmion 
crlled Check Connected IoT Devices. By doing so, im aings every connecmed device mo mrigger mhee 
mo send mheir currenm smrmus rnd version inforermion. Afmer receiving mhis drmr, rside froe aroeaming 
user mhe erin arge where user sees his/her owned IoT devices, Heimdallr checks for rny rvrilrble 
uadrme by querying SAA. There rre rgrin mhree aossible oumcoees of mhrm rcmion. Firsm, everymhing 
crn be ua-mo-drme, rnd mhus, we aroceed wimhoum rny rcmion. Secondly, mhere crn be r Heiedrllr 
inmerfrce uadrme for rn IoT device or finrlly, mhere crn be rn uadrme for rn IoT device imself. In rny 
crse, mhose mhree aossible rcmions eerge by rn or-join Ir eerge node  rnd wrim mo be joined by rn 
rnd-join Ir synchronizrmion brr  rs r resulm of mhe nexm IoT User rcmion. 
Froe mhe See Connected IoT Devices smrme IoT User crn mrke mhree differenm rcmions. He/she crn 
Logout rnd coealeme mhe scenrrio or Change Settings of Heimdallr such rs mhe ones shown in 
Figure 5 or lrsmly, choose rn IoT device mo conmrol. If he/she chooses mhe lrmmer oamion, im gems joined 
wimh mhe rwriming rcmion of Heimdallr –exalrined in mhe arevious arrrgrrah– by mhe rnd-join on 
mhe IoT User side rnd rs r resulm mhe user crn rccess mhe IoT device’s arge where mhe UI aermrining 
mo mhrm device is arovided. This is mhe arge where mhe user crn crerme rnd send mrsks mo mhe IoT 
device mhrough Heiedrllr rnd see mhe chrnging smrmus of im. 
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In mhe nexm subsecmion, mhe given sequence dirgrre will exalrin mhis exrcm sree scenrrio in eore 
demril by exalrining soee of mhe arrrllel rcmions mrken by mhe sysmee coeaonenms bum nom shown 
in Figure 6.       
4.1.4 Sequence Diagram 
 
Figure 7: Sequence Diagram of the Heimdallr System 
This figure shows the interactions of the Heimdallr system components (elements) sequentially for 




In mhe sequence dirgrre given in Figure 7 mhe inmerrcmions of mhe coeaonenms Ieleeenms  of mhe 
sysmee rre shown in r mieeline. Froe lefm mo righm mhe coeaonenms rre rligned rnd mhe aeriod of 
miee smrrms rm mhe moa rnd ends rm mhe bommoe. Thus, mhe very firsm rcmion is mrken by mhe IoT Device 
Maker by develoaing rnd relersing mhe aroducm for rn IoT device. Thrm aroducm crn be rny kind of 
sofmwrre relrmed mo mhe IoT device aroduced by mhrm erker Icoearny . However, in our aroof-of-
conceam deeo im will eimher be r sysmee uadrme for rn IoT device or rn UI uadrme of mhrm device 
insmrlled on Heiedrllr. Nome mhrm, mhis is rn rsynchronous rcmion mhrm crn be mrken rnymiee by mhe 
IoT Device Maker, rnd mhis is why im wrs nom shown in Figure 6; Activity Diagram. 
Once mhe aroducm is aublished, SAA receives rnd checks im rnd if im decides mhrm mhe aroducm hrs no 
securimy flrws mhrermening mhe drmr arivrcy, cermifies rnd smores im mo be senm when requesmed by 
Heimdallr. Mernwhile, rn IoT Device requesms regismrrmion mo Heimdallr rnd Heimdallr checks if 
rny service or uadrme is rvrilrble mo downlord for or relrmed mo mhrm device in SAA drmrbrse. Righm 
rfmer mhe successful regismrrmion of mhe IoT Device, rn IoT User requesms login mo Heimdallr. If user 
credenmirls rre correcm, mhe cookie senm in mhe HTTPS arckem is vrlid rnd mhe IP rddress of mhe 
requesmer is nom blrcklismed Heimdallr grrnms mhe rccess. Afmer mhrm, user crn mrke rny rcmion given 
in Figure 5. As im is eenmioned areviously, rn rcmion which chrnges mhe smrmus of rn IoT device is 
rlwrys delivered mo mhrm device rs r mrsk by Heiedrllr. In Figure 7, we see mhrm mhe IoT User mrkes 
rn rcmion crlled changeDeviceStatus(), mhis crn be rny such mrsk exalrined in errlier dirgrres. 
Nome mhrm, mhe arevious rcmion –crlled register()– mrken by mhe IoT Device does nom hrve mo be 
followed by mhe IoT User’s login requesm, on mhe conmrrry, im is momrlly unrelrmed wimh user rcmions. 
Whrm hraaens is mhrm, once mhe user is logged in, only mhe currenmly regismered devices will be shown 
on mhe erin arge which is nonemheless being conminuously uadrmed by Heiedrllr. 
The nexm subsecmions will aresenm mhe lower-level sysmee dirgrres in rn efform mo arovide r deeaer 
undersmrnding. We will firsm gem rn insighm on mhe clrss dirgrres of mhe sysmee coeaonenms which 
will be followed by mhe ER Ienmimy-relrmionshia  dirgrres of mhe drmrbrse enmimies used by SAA rnd 
Heimdallr. 
4.1.5 Class Diagrams 
In mhis subsecmion, clrss dirgrres of rll mhe clrsses iealeeenmed rnd used for our aroof-of-conceam 
sysmee will be discussed in demril. Nome mhrm, in mhese dirgrres soee of mhe clrss vrrirbles, 
funcmions rnd consmrucmors rre nom shown, rs well rs rny grrahicrl user inmerfrce IGUI  eleeenms. 
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Exceam for mhe consmrucmors, even mhough mhey hrve rcmurlly been iealeeenmed, unused funcmions 




Figure 8: Heimdallr Class Diagram 
This figure shows the relation between the classes of Heimdallr software; one of the main 




In mhe clrss dirgrre for Heimdallr given in Figure 8, we clrrify mhe differenm myaes of clrsses. Soee 
of mhese clrsses go under mhe arckrge crlled models, eerning mhrm mhose clrsses rre iealeeenmed 
mo be used rs enmimies of coeeon objecms reong mhe coeaonenms of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee. These 
rre nreely; User, Device, ATask, Product, TaskMessage, DeviceMessage, rnd SAAMessage.  
User objecms rre used mo hold drmr of Heimdallr users. Any user who is regismered rs eimher ADMIN 
or USER hrs r corresaonding User objecm crermed rnd smored in Heimdallr drmrbrse. 
Device objecms rearesenm mhe rcmurl ahysicrl IoT devices which hrve successfully esmrblished r 
connecmion mo Heiedrllr. Once rn IoT device is connecmed, r corresaonding Device objecm gems 
crermed wimh mhe device inforermion received during mhe firsm smrge of mhe connecmion; regismrrmion 
ahrse. Im includes mhe device nree, serirl nueber, ims rssigned IP rddress, rnd insmrlled firewrre 
rnd inmerfrce versions. Nome mhrm for siealicimy we used unique device nree rnd serirl nueber 
coebinrmions rs unique device Ies. eoing so we did nom hrve mo inmroduce MAC rddresses when 
rearesenming rn IoT device. Moreover, usrge of MAC rddresses eighm rlso be arobleermic, eore 
rboum mhrm will be discussed in Chramer 5; Simulation of Heimdallr and Experimentation.  
ATask objecm brsicrlly rearesenms r mrsk crermed rnd senm by Heiedrllr mo rn IoT device. To 
generrlize r mrsk we inmroduced rn inmeger code rnd r generic myae conmenm vrrirble in ATask clrss. 
This code crn rearesenm rnymhing rnd im is eernm mo be demereined rnd configured by mhe 
IoTDeviceMaker, eernwhile, mhe conmenm vrrirble holds mhe drmr corresaonding mo mhrm code. For 
insmrnce, r mrsk objecm wimh code=1 : content=25 rnd code=2 : content=true could be senm mo rn 
IoT mhereosmrm where code 1 eerns mhe meeaerrmure rnd code 2 eerns mhe aower smrmus of mhe 
device. Therefore, whrm mhe rbove mrsk is mrying mo sry is “murn on mhe mhereosmrm rnd sem mhe 
meeaerrmure mo 25 degrees Celsius”. Since mhe conmenm is of myae generic, rny IoT device crn be 
conmrolled using mhe sree clrss IATask  hrving differenm inmeraremrmions uaon receiam.  
To send mrsks froe Heimdallr mo IoTDevices we inmroduced mhe clrss TaskMessage. A 
TaskMessage objecm consisms of rn rrrry of ATask objecms rnd is used mo send mrsks crermed by 
Heimdallr mo IoTDevices. Sieilrrly, rny eessrge senm froe rn IoTDevice mo Heimdallr is r 
TaskMessage objecm wrraaed in r DeviceMessage objecm.  
We inmroduced DeviceMessage clrss mo be rble mo mell Heimdallr mhrm mhe eessrge im is receiving rs 
r TaskMessage is eimher r REGISTRATION eessrge or r STATUS eessrge. Whenever rn 
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IoTDevice mries mo esmrblish coeeunicrmion wimh Heimdallr, im firsm sends r REGISTRATION 
eessrge rlong wimh Heimdallr’s arssword mo be regismered, mhen im smrrms sending ims currenm smrmus 
in miee inmervrls demereined by mhe IoTDevice imself.  
Product rnd SAAMessage rre sieilrr clrsses used in mhe coeeunicrmion bemween Heimdallr rnd 
SAA. A Product objecm rearesenms r aroducm generrmed by mhe IoT device erker which will be 
exalrined lrmer. Im consisms of mhe essenmirl inforermion required mo describe im rlong wimh mhe binrry 
drmr of mhe aroducm imself. This inforermion conmrins mhe coearny nree which erkes mhe aroducm, 
aroducm nree, myae, relerse drme, version, URL which crn be used mo rccess mhe aroducm’s source, 
descriamion of mhe aroducm, binrry drmr rnd mhe Me5 checksue of mhrm drmr. For mhe auraose of our 
aroof-of-conceam version of mhe sysmee, r aroducm crn be r FIRMWARE_UPDATE or rn 
INTERFACE UPDATE, mhis is whrm we crll mhe aroducm myae. Every miee Heimdallr rsks for rn 
uadrme, SAA resaonds brck wimh rn SAAMessage. An SAAMessage conmrins bomh mhe lrmesm 
FIRMWARE_UPDATE rnd mhe lrmesm INTERFACE UPDATE. Nome mhrm, in rerl raalicrmions 
sending mhe whole aroducm every miee im is queried is undoubmedly rn inefficienm arrcmice. However, 
since we rrbimrrrily decided mo hrve our aroducms crrry r eock-ua drmr rs serll rs 32 bims for mesm 
auraoses, we didn’m differenmirme r resaond wimh only mhe lrmesm version inforermion rnd r full 
arckem resaond crrrying mhe coealeme aroducm drmr. 
Anomher arckrge we crlled is repository. Clrsses crlled CookieCodeRepo, UserDeviceRepo rnd 
UserRepo frll under mhrm arckrge. Errlier we rlso crlled mhose clrsses eAO. eAO siealy eerns 
ermr Access Objecm. These clrsses rre mhe links which connecm enmimies eenmioned rbove mo mheir 
corresaonding drmrbrse objecms. Therefore, in our crse whenever r Jrvr objecm hrs mo be insermed 
inmo r drmrbrse mrble, we crll ims corresaonding eAO, give mhe objecm mo im so mhrm im crn esmrblish 
mhe connecmion mo drmrbrse rnd execume mhe SQL query mo inserm mhrm given objecm. The sree raalies 
mo every kind of inmerrcmion erde wimh mhe drmrbrse. Thus, UserRepo is used mo smore, femch rnd 
check r User objecm mo rnd froe mhe user mrble in Heimdallr’s drmrbrse. CookieCodeRepo is used 
mo smore rnd check if mhe cookie received froe r clienm device is vrlid or nom. Sieilrrly, 
UserDeviceRepo is mo execume rny query relrmed mo users rnd mhe devices owned by mhee. One such 
query is crrried oum by findDeviceByUsername() funcmion of mhrm clrss. Given mhe nree Iunique  
of mhe user, im remurns r lism of Device objecms mo be used by rnomher Heimdallr mrsk. 
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Now, we would like mo searrrme mhe Heiedrllr sofmwrre inmo mwo ends rnd exalrin mhee 
indeaendenmly. Firsm one is mhe inmernrl nemwork. Here inmernrl nemwork eerns mhe coeeunicrmion 
bemween Heiedrllr rnd connecmed IoT devices. And mhe omher end we crll exmernrl nemwork 
eerning mhrm mhe coeeunicrmion bemween Heiedrllr rnd SAA, rnd rny myae of clienm device used 
mo connecm mo Heiedrllr.   
For inmernrl nemwork, we used bomh SSLSocket rnd SSLServerSocket objecms which coee wimh 
java.net arckrge mo esmrblish secure, full-dualex TCP connecmions bemween Heimdallr rnd 
IoTDevices. TCPServer rnd TCPClientHandler rre mhe resaonsible clrsses for mhrm. This 
TCPServer singlemon objecm rlwrys lismens for IoTDevices. Once r arckem is received froe rn 
IoTDevice, im inimirmes r TCPClientHandler objecm saecificrlly for mhrm device rnd runs im on r new 
mhrerd. Froe mhis aoinm on, every inmerrcmion done wimh mhis IoTDevice is conducmed rnd regulrmed 
by eerns of ims corresaonding TCPClientHandler objecm. 
Exmernrl nemwork crn rlso be divided inmo mwo arrms. Firsm arrm is mhe coeeunicrmion done wimh mhe 
SAA. This is sieilrr mo whrm we hrve done for mhe inmernrl nemwork coeeunicrmions. Insmerd of 
TCPServer clrss we hrve rnomher singlemon clrss crlled SAATCPClient. Agrin using SSLSocket im 
esmrblishes r secure TCP connecmion mo SAA. Nome mhrm unlike our inmernrl nemwork connecmions, 
mhis one is r hrlf-dualex TCP connecmion, since Heimdallr is mhe only one which inimirlizes queries 
rnd erkes requesms using SAAMessage objecms. The second arrm however is differenm; 
coeeunicrmion bemween Heiedrllr rnd clienm devices. Heimdallr arovides r secure web service 
Iusing HTTPS aromocol  mhrm crn be rccessed froe rny inmernem connecmed device rs im is described 
errlier. Thrm is exrcmly why im needs mo hrve r smrmic IP rddress mo funcmion aroaerly. Once r requesm 
erde mo Heiedrllr’s IP rddress im resaonds wimh ims login arge. Afmer r successful login, clienms rre 
redirecmed mo mheir hoeearges rnd so on Isee arevious dirgrres . All mhose requesms rre hrndled 
by mhe PageController clrss. If r user clicks on rn IoT device shown on mhe hoeearge, 
PageController redirecms mhe user mo mhe arge Iinmerfrce downlorded rnd insmrlled froe SAA  of 
mhrm device. Am mhis aoinm mhe HTTPS coeeunicrmion bemween mhe clienm device rnd Heimdallr gems 
uagrrded mo WebSockem Secure IWSS  coeeunicrmion. Afmer mhrm every requesm froe rnd mo mhe 
clienm is hrndled by mhe TaskController clrss. To be eore saecific, rny ua-mo-drme smrmus senm by rn 
IoTDevice mo Heimdallr is aushed mo mhis device’s arge mhrough WebSockem. Sieilrrly rny mrsk 
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crermed rnd senm by mhe clienm using mhrm arge is hrndled rgrin by mhe TaskController rnd arssed 
mo mhe IoTDevice by eerns of TCPClientHandler. 
In Figure 8, we crn see r umilimy clrss crlled KeyGenerator. This clrss is resaonsible for generrming 
new rccess codes rsynchronously for users. These codes rre mhen used mo check mhe vrlidimy of mhe 
rccess code which will be enmered by mhe user on mhe nexm rmmeeam mo login using r new clienm 
device. More rboum mhrm will be mrlked in Subsubsecmion 4.1.5.5. 
Finrlly, Application is mhe erin clrss where mhe TCPServer rnd SAATCPClient rre firsm inimirlized 
rnd rll mhe configurrmion clrsses rre boomsmrraaed, nreely WebSocketConfig rnd SecurityConfig. 
4.1.5.2 IoT Device 
 
Figure 9: IoT Device Class Diagram 
This figure shows the relation between the classes of an IoT device software; one of the main 
components of the Heimdallr system 
 
The only omher coeaonenm involved in deeonsmrrming mhe inmernrl nemwork working arinciale of mhe 
Heiedrllr sysmee is mhe IoT Device. In Figure 9, mhe clrss dirgrre of rn IoT device is given. Im is, 
however, essenmirl mo eenmion mhrm mhis rbove arogrre is eernm mo be used rs mhe core librrry for 
crerming vrriemy of IoT devices such rs rn IoT mhereosmrm or rn IoT TV. To do so, one hrs mo 
override mhe funcmion crlled process() of TaskHandler clrss rnd iealeeenm mhe funcmions of 
StatusController inmerfrce. Hence, differenm IoT devices rre given mhe sree working arinciale 
which erkes mhee coearmible wimh Heiedrllr while hrving unique rnd saecirlized wrys of 
hrndling mhe mrsks senm mo mhee. TCPClient is mhe singlemon clrss where mhe full-dualex secure 
sockem coeeunicrmion over TCP is esmrblished wimh Heimdallr. ConnectionHandler is r helaer 
clrss for mhe TCPClient rnd im is resaonsible for fixing connecmion issues rnd reesmrblishing im. For 
insmrnce, if Heimdallr swimches off ConnectionHandler nomices mhrm rnd smrrms ainging Heimdallr 
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in aresem miee inmervrls. Once im receives r resaonse froe Heimdallr im esmrblishes r new 
connecmion. Finrlly, DeviceMessage, TaskMessage, rnd ATask rre exrcmly mhe sree clrsses rs mhe 
ones we exalrined in Heimdallr clrss dirgrre IFigure 8 . 
4.1.5.3 SAA 
 
Figure 10: SAA Class Diagram 
This figure shows the relation between the classes of SAA software; one of the main components of 
the Heimdallr system 
 
On mhe exmernrl nemwork side of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee, one of mhe mhree coeaonenms is SAA. SAA 
rearesenms mhe role of our nom-for-arofim orgrnizrmion SAA. Im is coeaosed of six clrsses. In mhe 
clrss dirgrre of SAA given in Figure 10, Product rnd SAAMessage rre rgrin exrcmly mhe sree 
clrsses rs we exalrined in Heimdallr clrss dirgrre IFigure 8 . The erin clrss of SAA is crlled 
SAATCPServer. Im is resaonsible for esmrblishing hrlf-dualex secure TCP connecmions using 
java.net SSLServerSocket. Im lismens exrcmly mwo aorms; one for Heimdallr connecmions rnd rnomher 
one for IoTDeviceMaker connecmions. Any requesm received on aorm reserved for Heimdallr is 
mrrnsferred mo rnd hrndled by mhe HeimdallrHandler clrss. Likewise, rny requesm received on aorm 
reserved for IoTDeviceMaker is mrrnsferred rnd hrndled by mhe VendorHandler clrss. When r 
Product wrraaed in rn SAAMessage objecm is received froe rn IoTDeviceMaker, VendorHandler 
insmrnmirmes r DAO objecm rnd crlls ims insert() funcmion mo smore mhe Product received inmo mhe 
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raaroarirme mrble in mhe SAA drmrbrse. Sieilrrly, whenever Heimdallr erkes r requesm rsking mhe 
lrmesm FIRMWARE_UPDATE rnd mhe INTERFACE_UPDATE, mhis miee HeimdallrHandler 
insmrnmirmes r DAO objecm rnd crlls ims getProduct() funcmion mo femch mhe lrmesm uadrmes froe mhe 
drmrbrse. Finrlly, rlmhough im is of no ieaormrnce, DBInitializer is resaonsible for crerming mhe 
necessrry mrbles in mhe SAA drmrbrse when im is firsm run. 
4.1.5.4 IoT Device Maker 
The second erin coeaonenm of mhe exmernrl nemwork of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee is mhe IoT device 
erker. In our aroof-of-conceam raalicrmion im is rearesenmed by mhe arogrre crlled 
IoTDeviceMaker. Below ims clrss dirgrre is given in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11: IoT Device Maker Class Diagram 
This figure shows the relation between the classes of an IoT device maker software; one of the 
main components of the Heimdallr system 
 
As rlwrys Product is mhe objecm rearesenming eimher r FIRMWARE_UPDATE or rn 
INTERFACE_UPDATE erde by mhe IoTDeviceMaker. Here mhe role of esmrblishing secure TCP 
connecmions is rssigned mo mhe clrss crlled IoTDeviceMakerTCPClient. This clrss is rlso 
resaonsible for mhe only mrsk mhrm rn IoT device erker hrs in our aroof-of-conceam sysmee; 
aroducmion rnd aublicrmion of rn uadrme. Im insmrnmirmes rn objecm of mhe ProductGenerator clrss 
using mhe rrgueenms Iargs[]  given rm run miee. These rrgueenms mell mhe ProductGenertor whrm 
kind of aroducms im crn aroduce under which coearny’s nree. Then im rrndoely generrmes every 
rmmribume rrnging froe version nueber mo data required mo crerme r Product. Once im is done 
IoTDeviceMakerTCPClient sends mhe aroducm mo SAA mo be smored. 
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4.1.5.5 Client Device  
The finrl coeaonenm of mhe exmernrl nemwork of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee is mhe clienm device. A clienm 
device consisms of mhe key generrmor rnd r sofmwrre which rllows users mo connecm mo mhe Inmernem 
e.g. r web browser. Since Heiedrllr arovides r web raalicrmion service for ims users, mhey will be 
inmerrcming wimh Heiedrllr by siealy connecming mo im over mhe Inmernem by eerns of no ermmer whrm. 
Thrm is why in mhis subsubsecmion we will only be discussing mhe clrss dirgrre of mhe key generrmor 
Igiven in Figure 12  needed for generrming rccess codes for mhe firsm miee logins. 
 
Figure 12: Key Generator Class Diagram 
This figure shows the only class needed for generating access codes by the software installed on 
client devices. It is one of the main components of the Heimdallr system 
 
The KeyGenerator is mhe clrss which rsynchronously generrmes user saecific, one-miee-use rccess 
codes mo be used when logging in for mhe firsm miee mo Heiedrllr’s web inmerfrce froe r new clienm 
device. Hrving r size, alphabet rnd seed, im generrmes unique rccess codes every miee mhe funcmion 
generate() is crlled. Im ensures mhe vrlidimy of mhese rsynchronously generrmed rccess codes by 
working in mrndee wimh mhe Heimdallr’s KeyGenerator eenmioned in Subsubsecmion 4.1.5.1 rnd in 
dealoyeenm dirgrre Subsecmion 4.1.1. Bomh of mhese KeyGenerators rre exrcmly mhe sree, rnd 
mherefore, use exrcmly mhe sree rlgorimhe mo aroduce rnd vrlidrme mhese codes. Lem us exalrin how. 
On mhe clienm device mhe KeyGenerator gems inimirlized wimh r given seed. This is usurlly r 
aredemereined arssword chosen by mhe user. When mhe aublic funcmion generate() is crlled by mhe 
user, im crlls mhe arivrme funcmion generateNextKey() rnd feeds im wimh mhe seed. This funcmion firsm 
crlculrmes mhe ocmrl vrlues of mhe chrrrcmers coeaosing mhe seed. Im mhen gems mhe erxieue of mhee 
rnd shifms mhe alphabet by mhis erxieue vrlue. Now mhrm we hrve r new rlahrbem, im is miee mo 
generrme r new rccess code! To do so, our rlgorimhe imerrmes mhrough mhe given seed one eore miee 
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rnd realrce erch chrrrcmer wimh r new one froe our new rlahrbem. Since bomh mhe server-side 
KeyGenerator rnd ims counmerarrm clienm-side KeyGenerator hrve mo generrme exrcmly mhe sree new 
code wimhoum coeeunicrming, mhere hrd mo be r arecise wry of aicking mhese new chrrrcmers froe 
our new rlahrbem rrmher mhrn aicking mhee rrndoely. Hence whrm our rlgorimhe does is, im rdds 
mhe index vrlue of mhe currenm chrrrcmer of mhe seed mo ims ocmrl vrlue rnd uses mhe resulming inmeger 
vrlue rs rn index mo gem r new chrrrcmer froe our new rlahrbem. We mhen end ua building r new 
Smring of mhe sree lengmh rfmer imerrming mhrough mhe chrrrcmers of mhe currenm seed. Finrlly we 
reverse mhis Smring rnd remurn mhe resulming vrlue rs mhe new rccess code rnd mhe nexm seed mo 
generrme mhe nexm code. 
The counmerarrm of mhrm rlgorimhe in server-side does exrcmly mhe sree mhing once im receives rnd 
checks mhe vrlidimy of mhe currenm seed rnd uadrmes mhe corresaonding user enmry in drmrbrse by 
chrnging mhrm user’s rccess code wimh mhe newly generrmed one mo be checked mhe nexm miee. This 
is how we generrme one miee use rccess codes in rn rsynchronous rnd smrmeless ernner. 
4.1.6 ER Diagrams 
In mhis finrl subsecmion of high-level sysmee dirgrres, we will be exreining Heiedrllr sysmee’s 
enmimy-relrmionshia IER  dirgrres. This myae of dirgrre shows mhe relrmionshia bemween drmrbrse 
enmimies rnd mhe wry mhey rre smored. Hence im helas us fully coearehend mhe sysmee. In our aroof-
of-conceam version of Heiedrllr sysmee mhere rre only mwo coeaonenms which use r drmrbrse; 
Heimdallr rnd SAA. Recrll froe mhe clrss dirgrres of Heimdallr rnd SAA mhrm mhe eAOs or 
reaosimories were mhe clrsses mhrm crrry mhe drmr mo rnd froe mheir drmrbrses.  Below in Figure 13 





Figure 13: Heimdallr ER Diagram 
This figure shows the relationships of entity sets stored in Heimdallr database  
 
User objecms rre smored in Heimdallr drmrbrse rs User enmimies. A User enmimy eusm hrve r unique 
username rmmribume rs ims arierry key. A Device enmimy, on mhe omher hrnd, hrs r arierry key which 
consisms of mhree rmmribumes; device_name, device_serial, rnd device_IP_address. These mhree 
rmmribumes mogemher rre whrm erke r device disminguishrble froe omhers. The relrmion crlled 
User_Device is r join mrble of User rnd Device enmimies. This rllows us mo ersily ermch r device 
wimh ims owner. Sieilrrly, in order mo coealy wimh 3NF, User_IP rnd Cookie_Code mrbles rre 
searrrmed froe mhe User mrble rnd aum in r erny-mo-one relrmionshia wimh im. They siealy hold mhe 
drmr on IP rddresses rnd cookies rssigned mo saecific users.  
4.1.6.2 SAA  
 
Figure 14: SAA ER Diagram 




The omher drmrbrse in mhe Heiedrllr sysmee is used by SAA. A Company enmimy hrs r unique 
company_name rnd product_name coebinrmion rearesenmed by r uniquely rssigned ID. This ID is 
mhen used mo crerme r one-mo-erny relrmionshia wimh mhe Product enmimy. A Product rearesenms r 
aroducm crermed by rn IoT device erker rnd senm mo SAA mo be smored. When Heimdallr rsks for 
mhe lrmesm version of r saecific IoTDevice by sending SAA mhe coearny nree rnd mhe aroducm nree, 
SAA queries ims drmrbrse wimh mhese vrlues mo find rny ermching aroducms. Im firsm sorms mhe ermching 
resulms in descending order by mheir release_date rnd groua mhee by mheir type. Finrlly im remurns 
mwo aroducms, one rs mhe lrmesm FIRMWARE_UPDATE, rnd mhe omher one rs mhe lrmesm 
INTERFACE_UPDATE, rnd sends mhee mo Heimdallr wrraaed in rn SAAMessage. 
4.2 Tools and Technologies Used 
euring mhe develoaeenm of our aroof-of-conceam version of Heiedrllr we used Jrvr version 8 rs 
mhe erin arogrreeing lrngurge, rnd JrvrFX mo iealeeenm mhe GUI of mhe mesm coeaonenms which 
will be aresenmed in Chramer 5. Our firsm rmmeeam wrs mo deeonsmrrme mhe sysmee using Akkr rcmors10. 
Im wrs r single arojecm coeaosed of five rcmors; HeimdallrActor, SAAActor, IoTDeviceActor, 
IoTDeviceMakerActor, rnd ClientActor. However, desaime mhrm im wrs rble mo deliver mhe ider of 
how mhe sysmee works, im wrs rlso wry moo sieale rnd shrllow mo be rble mo show demrils on securimy 
issues or mhe inmerrcmion of r rerl user wimh mhe sysmee. Hence, we grve ua on rcmors rnd crermed 
four differenm maven arojecms, one for erch coeaonenm of mhe sysmee. Iealeeenmrmion of IoTDevice 
rnd IoTDeviceMaker were smrrighmforwrrd. As we discussed in Subsecmion 4.1.5, mhey consism of r 
couale of sieale clrsses which rllow mhee mo esmrblish mhe necessrry connecmion wimh omher 
coeaonenms of mhe sysmee. Erch of mhese connecmions bemween mhe sysmee coeaonenms –including 
mhe ones esmrblished by Heimdallr rnd SAA– rre eimher hrlf or full-dualex secure TCP connecmions 
rchieved using SSLSocket rnd SSLServerSocket bomh rre found under java.net arckrge. Since mhese 
clrsses arovide secure connecmion vir sockems rnd server sockems using aromocol crlled Trrnsaorm 
Lryer Promocol ITLS  or foreerly crlled Secure Sockems Lryer ISSL , we needed our own 
cermificrme mo be shrred during mhe TLS hrndshrke. Therefore, we crermed mwo self-signed 
cermificrmes one for SAA rnd rnomher one for Heimdallr using Jrvr Keymool Isee Aaaendix A . 
                                                 
10 A free and open-source toolkit which provides programming using the actor model. The actor model provides an 
abstraction that allows the programmer to model the classes as stateful entities communicating with each other 
asynchronously by explicit message passing [88]. 
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Almhough mhe myae of mhose cermificrmes is of no ieaormrnce in our aroof-of-conceam version, we 
used SHA256withRSA signrmure rlgorimhe mo sign mhee. Addimionrlly, we only used TLS version 
1.2, since version 1.3 seeeed mo hrve soee bugs which would unnecessrrily obsmrucm mhe gorl of 
mhe arojecm. And mo be coearmible wimh our cermificrmes we only used ciaher suim 
“TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256”. 
The biggesm rnd mhe eosm coealex coeaonenm of mhe enmire sysmee is mhe Heimdallr imself. Since im 
wrs such r coealex arogrre mo iealeeenm, considering our lieimed miee we decided mo use Saring 
Frreework rnd lem im elieinrme mhe boileralrme configurrmions needed mo smrrmua our web 
raalicrmion. As we eenmioned errlier in mhis araer mhrm mhere rre mwo arrms of Heiedrllr sofmwrre 
mhrm we crn nree; inmernrl rnd exmernrl nemwork. We know mhrm mhe inmernrl nemwork 
coeeunicrmion is rchieved by secure Jrvr sockems. Exmernrl nemwork however, is where mhe Saring 
Frreework coees inmo alry. We used Saring MVC mo build Heimdallr’s web raalicrmion which 
rllows users mo rccess mheir Heiedrllr, rnd mherefore, mheir IoT devices. MVC rrchimecmure 
coeaoses of mhree erin coeaonenms Model, View, rnd Conmroller. As we hrve discussed in clrss 
dirgrre of Heimdallr, ims eodels rre sieale POJOs IPlrin Old Jrvr Objecm ; User, Device, ATask, 
Product, TaskMessage, DeviceMessage, rnd SAAMessage. Ims conmroller mhrm hrndle user requesms 
is mhe PageController. And finrlly ims views Iarges  rre JrvrServer Prges IJSP  which rre 
dynreicrlly generrmed web arges on mhe server-side.   
We eenmioned mhrm mhe coeeunicrmion bemween mhe clienm device rnd mhe IoT device’s UI arovided 
by Heimdallr is rchieved using WebSockems IWS . To do mhrm, we benefimed froe Saring 
Frreework’s STOMP suaaorm. Sieale Texm Orienmed Messrging Promocol ISTOMP  is r sieale 
HTTP-like eessrging aromocol which is widely used in WebSockem raalicrmions. In our crse, when 
r clienm device rccesses rn IoT device’s inmerfrce Iarge , im ieeedirmely mries mo subscribe imself mo 
mhe Heimdallr’s WebSockem chrnnel using SockJS which is essenmirlly r JrvrScriam librrry mhrm 
rllows us mo crerme r coeeunicrmion chrnnel by aroviding r WebSockem-like objecm. Mernwhile, 
our WebSocketConfig clrss shown in Figure 8 rcms rs mhe STOMP broker mo mhe clienm. Then, rny 
eessrge Imrsk  senm mo mhrm chrnnel is roumed mo Heimdallr’s TaskController mo be hrndled 
rccordingly. Hence, since im is r full-dualex bi-direcmionrl chrnnel, clienm device does nom require 
r refresh mo see chrnges on mhe device arge. Moreover, in order mo erke Heimdallr-clienm device 
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coeeunicrmion rbsolumely secure we forced clienm devices mo use only HTTPS aromocol insmerd of 
HTTP rnd WSS insmerd of WS by one eore miee umilizing Heimdallr’s self-signed cermificrme.  
The omher mwo essenmirl Saring Frreework exmensions mhrm we hrve used were Saring Securimy rnd 
Saring Boom. We hrve used Saring Securimy mo configure Heimdallr’s login arge rnd login 
funcmionrlimy, rnd mo give or deny rccess mo soee URIs IUnifore Resource Idenmifier  deaending 
on mhe roles rnd credenmirls of mhe users. And Saring Boom rllowed us mo run Heimdallr’s web 
raalicrmion on rn eebedded Toecrm server mhrm coees wimh im.  
Finrlly, before we end mhis secmion, we would like mo eenmion our drmrbrse choices. Almhough rny 
omher myae of drmrbrse crn be linked mo our eAO clrsses rm rny miee, now, for mhe srke of siealicimy 
rnd mo erke our deeo lighmweighm we used H2 –rn in-eeeory drmrbrse– for bomh Heimdallr rnd 
SAA. The only difference mhough, SAA’s eAO uses PreparedStatement clrss found under mhe 
java.sql arckrge mo query ims drmrbrse, while Heimdallr’s eAOs use JdbcTemplate clrss found 
under mhe org.springframework.jdbc arckrge. However, during our mesms we hrve rerlized mhrm 
under hervy lord PreparedStatement hrs r frsmer resaonse miee mhrn JdbcTemplate. Hence, mhis is 
soeemhing mhrm needs mo be mhoroughly exreined rnd mesmed during mhe develoaeenm of mhe rerl 
aroducm.  
4.3 Conclusion 
Iealeeenmrmion of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee, while inmuimively sieale, requires coealex rcceamrnce 
issues which rre beyond mhe rerle of mhis mhesis which inmroduces r conceam wimh ims aroof-of-
conceam sieulrmion. Aside froe ims exigenm requireeenms for mhis ider mo work, mhe inmended fermures 
for Heiedrllr needs r mere of dedicrmed develoaers, fund, rnd eosm ieaormrnmly miee. However, 
mo vrlidrme our conceam, we hrve iealeeenmed r dry-run-mesm version of mhe aroaosed sysmee mo be 
mesmed rnd evrlurmed mo see ims coeaemency. 
To sue mhis chramer ua, we would like mo underline mhrm mhe mools we hrve used rnd mhe design 
decisions we hrve erde rre rs we hrve discussed in mhis secmion, smricmly given mhrm we rre crerming 
r aroof-of-conceam sieulrmion of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee. There is no doubm mhrm soee of mhose design 
decisions such rs usrge of in-eeeory drmrbrses need mo be chrnged rlong wimh aossibly soee 
mechnologies used for mhis arojecm. In mhe nexm chramer we will be exreining mhe sieulrmion we hrve 
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crermed by aroviding rn inmuimive flow dirgrre which will hela visurlize mhe overrll Heiedrllr 




5 Simulation of Heimdallr and Experimentation 
In mhe following inmuimive flow dirgrre IFigure 15  we arovided mhe momrl of mhe sysmee coeaonenms 
rnd mheir relrmionshias. In mhe dirgrre, smrrighm lines indicrmes mhrm mhe mwo coeaonenms linked by 
mhrm line, rre soeehow connecmed eimher by hrving r TCP connecmion, by being mhe sree arocess, 
or by running in mhe sree erchine. Mernwhile, dommed lines indicrme mhe flow of arocess by GUI 
eleeenms. For bigger version of mhe arrms of Figure 15 alerse refer mo Aaaendix B. Nome mhrm, in 




Figure 15: Intuitive Flow Diagram of the Heimdallr System 
This figure provides an overall view for the Heimdallr system simulation 
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As we crn see in Figure 15, we hrve r momrl of 8 erjor sysmee coeaonenms for mhe sieulrmion of 
mhe Heiedrllr sysmee linked mo erch omher wimh bold smrrighm lines. These rre, mhe Heiedrllr 
sofmwrre, mhe SAA sofmwrre, r web browser, r Key Generrmor, r nueber of IoT device aroducers, 
rnd mheir IoT devices Ihere we hrve lieimed mo mwo aroducers wimh one IoT device froe erch , rll 
running on r single sysmee. We sem one of mhe IoT device erkers mo sieulrme mhe coearny “S” rnd 
mhe omher one mo sieulrme mhe coearny “L”. Likewise, one of mhe IoT devices is sem mo be r S’s 
Serrm TV, while mhe omher one is sem mo be rn L’s Serrm Thereosmrm. 
Bomh S rnd L coearnies rre connecmed mo SAA rnd rny uadrme aroduced by mhee is senm mo SAA 
which crn be seen in mheir Log secmion. We crn rlso see whrm kind of aroducms mhey erke 
undernermh mheir mimle. Sieilrrly, froe SAA window we crn rccess rll of mhe connecmed IoT device 
erkers’ aroducms senm so frr rnd smored in SAA drmrbrse. We crn rlso rccess rny Heiedrllr 
connecmed mo mhis SAA rnd mheir log under mhe Connections secmion. Nome mhrm, in our sieulrmion 
we only hrve one Heiedrllr rcmive rm r miee wimh rn Ie; xxxxx. 
In mhe dirgrre, we see mhrm Heiedrllr hrs rn rdein inmerfrce which lerds mhe rdein mo r hoee 
arge rfmer r successful login. There, mhe rdein crn see mhe Connected Devices, SAA Status, rnd 
Registered Users. A connecmed IoT device’s arge gives demrils rboum mhe device such rs mhe device 
nree, serirl nueber, currenmly rssigned IP rddress, currenm firewrre rnd inmerfrce version, rnd 
mhe owners’ usernree. In mhe eiddle secmion of ims arge, Device Specific Properties rre given. 
These rre brsicrlly mhe device saecific mrsk codes designrmed by mhe device erker rnd mheir currenm 
conmenm vrlues. Finrlly, r device arge arovides Device Logs rm mhe bommoe secmion. There, mhe log 
of rny mrsk senm rnd rny DeviceMessage received by mhe Heiedrllr is shown. 
The connecmed SAA’s arge crn be rccessed vir mhe bummon arovided nexm mo SAA Status on mhe erin 
arge of Heiedrllr rdein inmerfrce. This arge shows mwo log secmions. The rbove one gives rny 
eessrge senm mo mhe SAA rnd mhe bommoe one gives rny resaonse received in remurn. And finrlly, 
rn rdein crn see mhe mrble of currenmly regismered users of mhis Heiedrllr rlong wimh mheir 
inforermion. 
As we srid, in mhis sieulrmion we hrve mwo connecmed IoT devices. One is L’s Serrm Thereosmrm 
rnd mhe omher one is S’s Serrm TV. In order mo connecm mhese devices, one needs mhe Heiedrllr 
arssword crermed for device regismrrmion. Once mhe correcm arssword is enmered, mhese devices gem 
connecmed mo our Heiedrllr rs im is shown in Figure 15. We rlso crermed rn inmerfrce for mhe 
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raalicrmion sieulrming rn IoT device. This inmerfrce aoas ua once mhe device is connecmed mo 
Heiedrllr. There we crn see mhe device rnd ims erker’s nree, serirl nueber, currenm firewrre 
version, owner’s usernree, Heiedrllr connecmion smrmus, rnd finrlly on mhe bommoe secmion mheir 
device saecific aroaermies which is exrcmly whrm we see in Device Specific Properties secmion in 
Heiedrllr inmerfrce’s device arge. 
Lrsm coeaonenm of our sieulrmion is mhe web inmerfrce of Heiedrllr which is used by mhe users mo 
inmerrcm wimh mheir IoT devices connecmed mo im. In Figure 15, we see mhe login arge of mhis inmerfrce 
wimh r mimle of “Heiedrllr User Login”. Afmer enmering mhe righm credenmirls, if mhere is no smored 
vrlid cookies in mhis clienm device, mhe user crn be aroeamed mo r second arge where rn rccess code 
is requesmed. Using mhe Key Generrmor, mhe user crn generrme r new code rnd aroceed mo mhe user’s 
hoee arge. Here, mhe user crn see his/her owned rnd currenmly connecmed IoT devices rnd rccess 
mheir inmerfrces mo inmerrcm wimh mhee. Every, device inmerfrce is saecificrlly crermed by mhe IoT 
device erker rnd cermified by mhe SAA. The lrmesm cermified version is regulrrly checked by 
Heiedrllr rnd insmrlled when r new one is rvrilrble. We see mhrm rny mrsk senm by mhe user mhrough 
mhe web inmerfrce of Heiedrllr is delivered mo mhe rcmurl IoT device. 
In mhe resm of mhis chramer we will be exalrining whrm kind of exaerieenms we hrve erde using mhis 
Heiedrllr sieulrmion rnd whrm is our overrll rssesseenm of mhe sysmee.  
5.1 Experimentation 
Prior mo begin develoaing mhe Heiedrllr sysmee, in order mo erke ourselves believe in our cruse 
before rnyone else, we wrnmed mo erke sure mhrm mhe securimy issues of IoT devices rre indeed rs 
serious rnd ubiquimous rs we hrve rerd froe counmless rrmicles. Hence, we hrve discovered r 
websime crlled Shodrn [81] where IP rddresses of rll of mhe inmernem connecmed IoT devices rre 
lismed. Here we browsed for IP creerrs rnd aicked mhe URLs of five of mhee. We rlso serrched 
for defrulm usernree-arssword arirs for mhose creerrs by mheir ernufrcmurer rnd mhe aroducm 
nrees. Then, we smrrmed mrying mhose arirs oum which we hrve found on mhe Inmernem for free rnd 
aublicly! The resulms were rcmurlly shocking, we ernrged mo rccess inmerfrces of mhree IP creerrs 
oum of five wimh erse. The worsm arrm is, we could even chrnge mhe rngle of mhe creerrs, gem live 
smrere rnd even chrnge semmings rnd none of im wrs even illegrl. Now mhrm we hrd incimed, we 
smrrmed mhe develoaeenm arocess righm rwry.   
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Wimh r working aroof-of-conceam sieulrmor of Heiedrllr sysmee, we firsm checked mhe inmegrimy of 
mhe sysmee mo erke sure mhrm mhere were no flrws wimhin mhe brsic funcmionrlimy including ims 
drmrbrse relrmed rcmions. Every use crse is mesmed wimh r single user rnd single IoT device, single 
user rnd eulmiale IoT devices, eulmiale users rnd single IoT device, rnd eulmiale users rnd 
eulmiale IoT devices using differenm clienm devices wimh differenm cookie rnd IP rddresses. We rlso 
mesmed SAA wimh single rnd eulmiale IoTDeviceMakers wimh single rnd eulmiale myaes of aroducms. 
Since one arrm of mhe Heimdallr is r web raalicrmion, mhe sysmee eusm be robusm enough mo be rble 
mo negrme every kind of known erlicious web rmmrck for rbsolume securimy. However, since 
aenemrrmion mesming is coealemely rnomher brrnch of exaermise, due mo our miee lieimrmions, rm mhis 
aoinm we hrve only focused on rnd rvoided soee of mhe eosm coeeon rmmrcks on web services, 
nreely Cross-sime Requesm Forgery ICSRF , SQL Injecmion, rnd Cross-sime Scriaming IXSS . 
Almhough CSRF aromecmion is rlrerdy arovided by mhe CsrfConfigurer funcmion of mhe Saring 
Securimy by defrulm, we hrd mo mesm XSS rnd SQL Injecmion rmmrcks on our web raalicrmion mo erke 
sure mhrm im hrs no securimy holes on such r big scrle. 
Afmer r mhorough exreinrmion of mhe Heiedrllr source code, we could only find one funcmion where 
rn SQL Injecmion eighm rcmurlly be hrreful; Heiedrllr rdein inmerfrce rumhenmicrmion. In mhis 
funcmion we feed mhe injecmed drmr source –which is mhe Heiedrllr drmrbrse– mo Saring configured 
AuthenticationManagerBuilder Iauth  rlong wimh mhe usernree rnd arssword arir enmered on mhe 
login arge which mhen execumes mhe following code:  
auth.jdbcAuthentication().dataSource(dataSource) 
.usersByUsernameQuery("SELECT USERNAME, PASSWORD, ENABLED FROM 
USER WHERE USERNAME=?") 
.authoritiesByUsernameQuery("SELECT USERNAME, ROLE FROM USER 
WHERE USERNAME=?"); 
 
Since, mhis rumhenmicrmion arocess hrndled by mhe Saring Securimy we were nom rble mo chrnge mhe 
source code. Therefore, in order mo erke sure mhrm im is resismrnm mo SQL Injecmion, we rrn mhe rmmrck 
using our own erlicious SQL queries rs usernree rnd arssword inaums. Soee of mhee rre rs 
follows: 
 ;DROP TABLE USER; 
 “ OR “”=” 
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 admin OR 1=1 
And sieilrr vrrirmions rnd coebinrmions of mhese, which evenmurlly remurn mrue smrmeeenms when 
execumed. Formunrmely, we were nom rble mo obmrin rny erlicious resulms froe our rmmrcks. Thus, mhis 
exaerieenm hrs aroved mhrm mhe Heiedrllr sofmwrre is resismrnm mo SQL Injecmion rmmrcks, rnd lefm 
us wimh mhe mhird rmmrck which we need mo rvoid; XSS. 
While we were exreining mhe source code of Heiedrllr mo find rny vulnerrbilimy mo SQL Injecmion 
rmmrcks, we rlso keam rn eye for mhe flrws which ery be vulnerrble mo XSS rmmrcks. Evenmurlly, we 
hrve nomiced mhrm mhe mrsk eessrges ITaskMessage  crermed by mhe user on mhe clienm device rnd 
senm mo mhe corresaonding IoT devices vir Heiedrllr, rre never checked. Therefore, rny erlicious 
scriam code crn be smored rs mhe conmenm of r mrsk IATask  rnd senm mo mhe IoT device rs r mrsk 
eessrge. We rlso rerlized mhrm if mhe IoT device rcceams mhrm mrsk rnd smores im rs ims smrmus, im 
evenmurlly sends im brck mo Heiedrllr mo be disalryed rs mhe currenm smrmus of mhis device on mhe web 
inmerfrce. This wrs mhe biggesm vulnerrbilimy of our sysmee, since, mo soee exmenm im relies on cookies 
when im coees mo web raalicrmion securimy, rnd smerling cookies is one of mhe eosm coeeon use 
crses of XSS rmmrcks. If r aeraemrrmor hijrcks r Heiedrllr user’s session by smerling his/her cookie 
mhrough rn injecmed scriam, rny IoT device owned by mhis user becoees exaosed mo furmher 
erlevolenm rcmions. To armch mhrm securimy hole, we rdded r serll code which umilizes r librrry 
crlled Jsoua rnd smrias rny aomenmirlly hrreful chrrrcmer or HTML mrg froe mhe mrsk eessrge 
crermed by mhe user before sending im mo mhe corresaonding IoT device: 
        task.getTaskList().replaceAll(aTask -> { 
            if(aTask.getContent() instanceof String) 
                aTask.setContent(Jsoup.clean((String)aTask.getContent(), Whitelist.none())); 
            return aTask; 
        });    
 
By doing so we rssured mhrm rny inaum received froe mhe user who uses Heiedrllr web inmerfrce, 
is clernsed froe rny aomenmirlly hrreful conmenm, rnd mherefore, srfe mo be senm rnd smored. In mhe 
nexm arrm of mhe develoaeenm work, our gorl is mo mesm rll omher known rmmrcks rnd rddress rny 
vulnerrbilimies found in Heiedrllr sofmwrre. 
Aside of mhese securimy armches, we rlso erde sure mhrm Hyaermexm Trrnsfer Promocol Secure 
IHTTPS  is mhe only aromocol used by mhe clienm devices when coeeunicrming wimh Heiedrllr mo 
increrse securimy. However, during our mesms we rerlized mhrm mhe web rnmivirus arogrres rnd mhe 
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browsers mheeselves rre blocking mhe rccess mo Heiedrllr becruse of mhe frcm mhrm ims TLS 
cermificrme is self-signed. Thus, for mhe rerl aroducm we hrve mo gem r mrusmed CA ICermificrme 
Aumhorimy  raaroved one. Furmhereore, im is ieaormrnm mo rerlize mhrm since qurnmue coeaumers 
smrrmed mo becoee rn rcmurl mool modry, rs eosm of mhe eLT rlgorimhes does, Heiedrllr should rlso 
rdoam qurnmue ieeune encryamion rlgorimhes rrmher mhrn jusm relying on rlgorimhes like RSA 
IRivesm–Shreir–Adleern .  
We rlso mesmed mhe consismency of our rsynchronous Key Generator rlgorimhe mo erke sure mhrm 
mhe mwo-frcmor rumhenmicrmion works flrwlessly when r requesm is erde froe r new clienm device 
mhrm doesn’m crrry r vrlid cookie. Almhough, mhe currenm rlgorimhe works rs inmended, we nomiced r 
serll bug mhrm crn lower mhe securimy level mhrm we rre mrying mo rchieve rnd erinmrin. The rlahrbem 
mhrm we rre using mo crerme mhe nexm rccess code for r user is rlwrys mhe sree every miee. Moreover, 
since every user uses mhe sree key generrmor rlgorimhe, everyone’s generrmor uses exrcmly mhe 
sree rlahrbem mo generrme mheir codes. We know mhrm if mhe firsm code rssigned by r user is known, 
mhe nexm one for mhis user crn be rnd is generrmed by feeding im mo mhe key generrmor. Which eerns 
mhrm, rny miee in mhe fumure if r aeraemrrmor reverls mhe lrsm used rccess code of r user, mhis aerson 
crn effecmively generrme mhe nexm code using his/her own key generrmor wimhoum mhe rcmurl owner’s 
aereission rnd knowledge. In order mo arevenm mhrm, one of our arierry gorls is mo inmroduce one 
eore inmeger seed aicked by mhe user rnd srve im rlong wimh mhe user’s firsm code in bomh Heiedrllr 
rnd user’s own key generrmor. This seed will mhen be used mo scrreble mhe rlahrbem every miee r 
new rccess code needs mo be generrmed. Furmhereore, mhis scrrebled rlahrbem will rlso be smored 
behrlf of mhrm user mo be re-scrrebled during mhe nexm key generrmion arocess. Therefore, even 
mhough r aeraemrrmor wrs rble mo obmrin mhe lrsm code used by mhe user, in order mo generrme mhe nexm 
correcm key, he/she hrs mo use mhe exrcm sree key generrmor raalicrmion areviously used rnd owned 
by mhe user.   
Furmhereore, during our mesms, we rlso nomiced soee omher eismhoughm fermures mhrm we hrve 
iealeeenmed were eimher broken or aosing r securimy risk. For insmrnce, rm firsm we were using MAC 
rddresses when regismering rn IoT device mo Heiedrllr. However, since MAC rddresses rre never 
senm encryamed, rn rmmrcker could ervesdroa on mhe arckems mhrm is senm froe r wirelessly connecmed 
IoT device rnd mhrough MAC saoofing, rn unknown IoT device crn ieaersonrme mhrm regismered 
device rnd grin rccess mo Heiedrllr. Since, one hrs mo ahysicrlly rccess r device mo gem ims serirl 
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nueber, we decided mo use im rlong wimh mhe device’s nree rnd Heiedrllr arssword when 
regismering mo arevenm MAC saoofing rnd relrmed rmmrcks. Anomher exreale, wrs mhe fermure mhrm 
rllows users mo blrcklism or whimelism IP rddresses mo indicrme whemher mo rllow or deny requesms 
originrming froe mhee. However, we obviously eissed mhe frcm mhrm only Heiedrllr’s IP rddress is 
smrmic rnd rleosm rll of mhe clienm devices hrve dynreic IP rddresses. Thus, blrcklisming r clienm 
device’s IP could only hela users mo rejecm rny requesm froe mhrm device unmil ims IP rddress is 
rerssigned. Therefore, we reeoved mhrm fermure rnd mhen inmroduced cookies. Though, im is smill 
aossible mo blrcklism IP rddresses mo resmricm Heiedrllr mo nom receive bum send drmr mo mhose 
desminrmions. eoing so im could rcmurlly hela arevenming unwrnmed drmr exfilmrrmion or eeoS rmmrcks 
lrunched wimh mhe Heiedrllr mo soee exmenm.  
One eore ieaormrnm observrmion mo eenmion is mhe soeewhrm high mrrffic on SAA. When we were 
rnrlyzing mhe nemwork mrrffic of Heimdallr we hrve nomiced mhrm mhe Heimdallr is rcmurlly 
exhrusming SAA by conminuously requesming for new uadrme inforermion in aredemereined miee 
inmervrls. When r rerl life scenrrio is considered where mhousrnds of Heiedrllrs requesming mheir 
regionrl SAA servers, im does nom sound good. Hence, our aroaosimion mo mhrm issue is mo rssign 
unique Ies mo erch rnd every Heiedrllr rnd lem mhee regismer mheeselves mo mheir regionrl Imhe 
closesm  SAA server. So, insmerd of lemming Heiedrllrs mo do mhe requesms, we crn hrve SAA servers 
mo nomify mheir regismered Heiedrllrs when mhere is rcmurlly r new uadrme mo be insmrlled. This would 
definimely lighmen mhe mrrffic on SAA servers, eoreover, mhese unique Heiedrllr Ies crn be used mo 
iealeeenm even grermer fermures in mhe fumure. 
Overrll, rside of mhese serll mwerks, mhe currenm version of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee works rs inmended 
wimh rll mhe brsic funcmionrlimy rfmer rll of mhe mesms on which we rrn on locrl nemwork. However, 
even mhough mhe ider of mhis sysmee showed ims coeaemency mo derl wimh mhe currenm IoT relrmed 
issues in our mesms, we concluded mhrm for eore rccurrme resulms, rn rlahr aromomyae should be 
iealeeenmed rnd mesmed in r myaicrl rerl usrge realicrmion wimh r eix of sieulrmed serrm IoT 
devices mo rcmurlly see how im aerfores in arrcmice. 
5.2 Analysis and Assessment 
In mhis finrl secmion of mhis chramer, we would like mo discuss how hrrd or ersy is mo rerlize mhe 
Heiedrllr sysmee rnd whrm mhe mechnicrl requireeenms rre mo aum im inmo arrcmice. In meres of IoT 
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devices, IoT device erkers rnd clienm devices nomhing is differenm. Only exceamion is mhrm IoT 
device erkers will hrve mo follow r smrndrrd when develoaing sofmwrre for mheir IoT devices. This 
smrndrrd rs we discussed errlier is whrm rllows Heiedrllr mo locrlly run bomh mhe server-side 
services rnd mhe clienm-side raalicrmions of IoT devices which arovide ims users r UI mo inmerrcm 
wimh. We rlso srid mhrm mhese raalicrmions or UIs rre currenmly coeaosed of r couale of JrvrScriam 
rnd JSP files aer IoT device in our aroof-of-conceam version. However, mhis crn surely chrnge mo 
r aoinm where Heiedrllr hrs ims own forerm rnd Aaalicrmion Progrreeing Inmerfrce IAPI  for IoT 
device erkers mo use when develoaing Heiedrllr coearmible sofmwrre. 
Anomher eusm hrve is mhe usrge of IPv6 aromocol. In Chramer 3, Secmion 3.2, we hrve discussed mhrm 
mhe Heiedrllr needs r smrmic IP mo be rble mo inherim r clienm-server eodel. When mhe inevimrble 
dealemion of IPv4 rddress aool is considered, smrrming ua r new, IP rddress hungry sysmee like 
Heiedrllr hinging uaon im is jusm nom wise. Therefore, rn ummer solumion would be mo rssign IPv6 
rddresses mo Heiedrllrs which is formunrmely aossible. 
When im coees mo Heiedrllr imself mhere is rlso nomhing discourrging. We mesmed our sysmee in r 
erchine wimh mhe following saecificrmions: 
 Processor   : Intel® Core™ i7-4700HQ CPU @ 2.40GHz 
 Insmrlled Meeory IRAM  : 16,0 GB 
 Sysmee Tyae   : 64-bit Operating System, x64-based  processor 
 OS    : Windows 10 Home 
euring our mesms Isee Aaaendix C  mhe highesm CPU usrge wrs 20% which occurred when 
Heimdallr firsm inimirlizing mhe eebedded Toecrm server. On mhe omher hrnd, rverrge CPU usrge 
wrs rround 0.2% wimh seldoe saikes of 10%. When im coees mo eeeory usrge, mhe rllocrmed JVM 
hera size wrs rround 0.50 GB oum of 4.26 GB rnd mhe hera used wrs rlwrys less mhrn 0.25 GB 
mhroughoum rn 18 einumes mesm run. This 0.25 GB I250 MB  includes our H2 in-eeeory drmrbrse 
I~2 MB , eebedded Toecrm server I~15 MB , Heiedrllr source code I~40MB , rnd r couale of 
JSP arges which hrve r size of less mhrn 10 KB in momrl. Here r couale of mhings crn chrnge. For 
insmrnce we ery wrnm mo use r hervier web server like WebLogic which currenmly hrs r size of 
800 MB or we ery wrnm mo swimch mo r aersismenm drmrbrse like MySQL which is rround 300 MB 
righm now. Therefore wimhoum rny user or IoT device drmr, Heiedrllr sofmwrre crn be esmiermed mo 
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hrve r size of rround 300 MB einieue rnd 1.35 GB erxieue. We rlso esmiermed how euch 
sarce mhe drmrbrse could occuay in arrcmice. If we consider r hoee nemwork wimh 10 users erch 
hrving dismincm 20 IoT device rnd 10 clienm devices wimh vrlid cookies rnd IP rddresses, im erkes 
r momrl of 10 muale of user drmr, alus 200 muale of device drmr, alus 100 muale of user-cookie rnd 
rnomher 100 muale of user-IP drmr in our drmrbrse. We generously crlculrmed every muale by ignoring 
mhe size of binrry, inm rnd enue myae rmmribumes rnd rssueing every rmmribume rs VARCHAR(255) 
Isee Figure 13 for rcmurl vrlue rnd myaes . If we use UTF-8 encoding, every chrrrcmer crn hrve r 
size of ua mo 8 bymes erch which erkes 765 bymes aer rmmribume. Am mhis aoinm we crn even be eore 
generous rnd consider every rmmribume 1 KB. Therefore, for IP rnd cookie mrbles we hrve 2 rmmribumes 
erch, rnd for user rnd device mrbles we hrve 5 rmmribumes erch which erkes 1450 KB in momrl in 
our crse. Moreover, if we hrve 200 dismincm IoT devices mhrm eerns we hrve 200 dismincm JSP arges 
wimh mheir corresaonding JS files. We rlrerdy know mhrm mhe coebinrmion of mhese files is rboum 10 
KB in our aroof-of-conceam scenrrio which erkes rn exmrr 2000 KB of drmr mo be smored in our 
drmrbrse. Hence, we crn confidenmly sry mhrm under mhe given circuesmrnces mhe esmiermed 
erxieue size needed for mhe drmrbrse would be 3450 KB or rboum 3.5 MB in momrl. When we 
consider mhe smorrge needed for Heiedrllr sofmwrre imself, 3.5 MB of drmrbrse enmry becoees 
insignificrnm for mhe resulm. 
The finrl requireeenm needed mo be considered is mhe brndwidmh. Since one arrm of Heiedrllr is r 
web raalicrmion, im needs mo hrve enough brndwidmh mo be rble mo erinmrin r frsm rnd funcmionrl 
coeeunicrmion wimh ims users. Since we rnrlyzed mhe nemwork mrrffic of our aroof-of-conceam 
version –running on locrlhosm– using r looabrck rddress, our raaroxiermion wrs highly rough rnd 
hyaomhemicrl, rlbeim, im should give enough inforermion mo eove on. If we rre mo conminue wimh our 
arevious exreale where we hrd r hoee nemwork of 10 users, mhe highesm mrrffic crn be exaecmed 
when or if rll of mhese 10 users requesm mo rccess mheir IoT devices’ UIs rm mhe exrcm sree miee. 
Then Heiedrllr hrs mo send rll mhose JSP rnd JS arirs mo mhe requesmers which will cruse r saike in 
mrrffic. We srid mhrm r arir crn hrve r size of 10 KB. Moreover, our rnrlysis showed mhrm mhe highesm 
vrlue of cueulrmive bymes recorded for r user wrs indeed rround 9 KBas. However, lem us aush im 
mo mhe lieims rnd rssuee mhrm our arir is 64 KB which is mhe erxieue size r JSP file crn be. Thus, 
if we rssuee mhrm mhe Heiedrllr in mhis house hrs rn uasmrere brndwidmh of 80 Mbas, im eerns 
mhrm im crn send 80000000 bims aer second. Since 64 KB is equrl mo 512000 bims, mhis Heiedrllr crn 
send 156 UIs aer second or in omher words im crn resaond mo 156 users rm mhe sree miee under ims 
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herviesm mrrffic which is eore mhrn enough when considered mhrm im hrs only 10 users. The sree 
raalies for mhe downsmrere brndwidmh needed mo coeeunicrme rnd femch sofmwrre uadrmes froe 
SAA. Hence, for r regulrr hoee nemwork r nemwork brndwidmh of 80 Mbas seees mo be eore mhrn 
enough for Heiedrllr mo funcmion aroaerly. 
Considering rll of mhe rbove raaroxiermions we envisrge mhrm rn oamieized Heiedrllr sofmwrre 
crn ersily run on r serll single-borrd coeaumer like Rrsaberry Pi 3 Model B+ [82] wimh mhe 
following saecificrmions: 
 Broadcom BCM2837B0, Cortex-A53 (ARMv8) 64-bit SoC @ 1.4GHz 
 1GB LPDDR2 SDRAM 
 2.4GHz and 5GHz IEEE 802.11.b/g/n/ac wireless LAN, Bluetooth 4.2, BLE 
 Gigabit Ethernet over USB 2.0 (maximum throughput 300 Mbps) 
 Extended 40-pin GPIO header 
 4 USB 2.0 ports 
 5V/2.5A DC power input 
 Power-over-Ethernet (PoE) support (requires separate PoE HAT)  
Im is however ieaormrnm mo nome mhrm mhese raaroxiermions were only crlculrmed for our aroof-of-
conceam version of Heiedrllr sofmwrre. Hence, mhere is no doubm mhrm mhe requireeenms of mhe rerl 
aroducm will vrry rnd eosm arobrbly will be higher. Nonemheless, we do nom foresee rny unsolvrble 




6 Conclusion and Future Work 
IoT devices rre aroliferrming rnd becoeing every dry mools for mhe ordinrry aerson. The ubiquimy 
of mhese devices rllows us mo see mhee even in mhe arivrme eoeenms of our lives. The rccess of mhe 
drmr mhrm we arovide mo IoT device erkers –by using mhese devices– exaoses our hrbims, roumines 
rnd schedule in rddimion mo mhe brse drmr given ua in good frimh. Thus, rll mhe securimy issues relrmed 
mo drmr exaosed mo mhe IoT device suaaliers, mhe mhird arrmies mhey use, rnd mhe vulnerrbilimies hidden 
in mhe IoT devices’ hrrdwrre rnd sofmwrre is becoeing r eore serious mhrerm mo arivrcy. As r resulm 
of our smudy of mhose issues we rerlized mhrm rs long rs rn IoT device is rble mo rccess mhe Inmernem 
freely, arivrcy of mhe user drmr is coearoeised. For mhis rerson we crermed mhe Heiedrllr sysmee. 
Heiedrllr crn be described rs r gurrdirn mhrm enhrnces mhe funcmion of mhe users’ hoee roumers 
rnd builds r formress on arivrme nemworks. Im eonimors rnd conmrols mhe incoeing rnd oumgoing drmr 
mrrffic mo rnd froe mhe IoT devices connecmed mo im rnd only rllows requesms froe mrusmed sources 
wimh rumhorized users hrving secure credenmirls. By doing so, regrrdless of whemher mhere is r 
hrrdwrre or sofmwrre flrw or rn issue wimh r service used on server-side, im gurrrnmees mhrm mhe user 
drmr senm mo rnd froe mhe IoT devices never exfilmrrme mo rny unwrnmed alrces. Addimionrlly, im is 
rble mo connecm mo SAA for rccess mo rll cermified sofmwrre rnd ims uadrmes for rn IoT device. The 
sysmee mhus gurrrnmees mhrm mhe users’ sensimive rnd arivrme drmr flows only bemween mhe IoT device 
rnd mhe user imself. 
Our currenm gorl is mo iealeeenm rn rcmurl rlahr version of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee rnd mesm im in r 
rerl life scenrrio. This crn be done by eodifying rn rlrerdy exisming oaen-source roumer firewrre 
such rs ee-WRT which is r Linux-brsed oaen-source firewrre develoaed rs r realrceeenm for 
mhe inconsismenm smock firewrre of soee saecific roumer eodels [83]. Moreover, rs we discussed in 
mhis araer mhrm mhe Heiedrllr is r lrrge scoaed solumion simming in mhe herrmh of mhe drmr mrrffic. Using 
mhis rs rn rdvrnmrge, mhe sysmee crn be furmher iearoved by rdoaming rn oaen-source IeS 
IInmrusion eemecmion Sysmee  which enrbles im mo recognize armmerns of eore coealex erlicious 
rmmrcks rnd blocks mhee. A crndidrme for such r mrsk crn be mhe oaen-source, nemwork-brsed IeS 
crlled Snorm [84].  
Sieilrrly, since rll of mhe user drmr arsses mhrough Heiedrllr, im crn collecm rnd smore rll mhrm drmr 
for r lrmer reference while hrving rll of im under mhe conmrol rnd aossession of mhe owner of mhe 
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sysmee [44]. An exreale for such r reference could be drmr lrboring rs we discussed in Proposed 
Solutions secmion of Chramer 2. If rnd when mhis kind of rn ider is aum inmo arrcmice, Heiedrllr users 
will be rble mo consider selling mheir smored aersonrl inforermion mo whoe arying for im. There rre 
rlso soee omher iders rnd serll mwerks wriming mo be rerlized mo erke mhe sysmee eore relirble 
rnd secure. An exreale crn be mhe develoaeenm rnd usrge of r smrnd-rlone raalicrmion running 
on clienm devices rnd linked mo erch user’s own Heiedrllr wimh r one-miee arssword rnd/or rccess 
code. Thrm wry no omher connecmion crn even be sem mo rnyone else’s Heiedrllr. Addimionrlly, mhe 
IP rddress of mhe requesmer crn rumoermicrlly be blrcklismed by mhe sysmee rfmer r couale of wrong 
usernree-arssword mries. Even mhough, mhese rre jusm serll mwerks on mhe sysmee, mhey crn erke 
r big difference rgrinsm soee saecific myae of erlicious rmmrcks. A erjor rddimion mo our aroaosrl, 
however, crn be mhe arovision of aublic nom-for-arofim services for IoT devices mo use. If we wrnm 
user drmr mo be ummerly srfe rnd keam arivrme wimhoum giving ua on soee essenmirl mhird-arrmy services 
which rre required for soee IoT devices bum crnnom be arovided locrlly, sieilrr services eusm be 
esmrblished by mhe mrusmed rumhorimies. An exreale of such r service could be wermher forecrsm. If 
rn IoT device requires mhis kind of r service mo be fully funcmionrl, im hrs mo be erde rvrilrble bum 
nom by r mhird-arrmy.     
Im is rlso ieaormrnm mo rerlize mhrm r sysmee like Heiedrllr ery be very difficulm wimh mhe currenm 
mechnology mo aum inmo arrcmice becruse of ims need of smrmic IP, high aerforernce hrrdwrre, rnd 
mhe sysmee’s eusm hrve; SAA. For mhis rerson, we suggesm mhrm im crn firsm be iealeeenmed in serll-
scrle, for insmrnce, for VIPs IVery Ieaormrnm Person  or eilimrry aersonnel rnd mhen erde aublic 
for regulrr users over miee. 
As our finrl mhoughm, r sysmee like Heiedrllr crn be mhe foundrmion of grermer develoaeenms rnd 
brerkmhroughs in dismribumed mechnologies while rssuring mhe drmr arivrcy. An exreale ider crn be 
r Frcebook like sysmee crermed by eesh of Heiedrllrs exchrnging soee aersonrl inforermion 
under ims owner’s consenm. This is jusm r sieale exreale of whrm crn be rchieved in mhe fumure wimh 
mhe hela of such r sysmee.  
 
We see our sysmee rs mhe smrrm of mhe swing of mhe aendulue mo mhe err where mhe drmr subjecm did 
nom need oumside for-arofim drmr smorrge rnd service Icloud  rnd would lerd mo omher develoaeenm 
mo re-crerme arivrcy areserving version of whrm is being offered by modry's big mech coearnies. 
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Wimh judicirl user inmerfrce, oaerrmion of Heiedrllr would be erde rs ersy rnd convenienm rs soee 
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 Appendix A is aroving mhe figures mhrm rre showing mhe demrils of self-signed TLS 
cermificrmes of Heiedrllr rnd SAA. 
 Appendix B is aroviding momrl of 6 figures which rre mhe zooeed in arrms of mhe inmuimive 
flow of mhe Heiedrllr sysmee dirgrre given in Figure 15. 
 Appendix C is aroviding mhe screenshom of mhe VisurlVM, mhe sofmwrre eonimoring mool 
mhrm we used mo rnrlyze Heiedrllr sofmwrre, during our exaerieenmrmion. 
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8.1 Appendix A 
 
Figure 16: Heimdallr’s Self-Signed TLS Certificate 





Figure 17: SAA’s Self-Signed TLS Certificate 




8.2 Appendix B 
 
Figure 18: Intuitive Flow Diagram of the Heimdallr System (part 1) 
This figure gives a closer look at the relationship between the SAA and the two simulated IoT 




Figure 19: Intuitive Flow Diagram of the Heimdallr System (part 2) 
This figure gives a closer look at the relationship between the SAA and the Heimdallr along with 




Figure 20: Intuitive Flow Diagram of the Heimdallr System (part 3) 
This figure gives a closer look at the Heimdallr admin interface and its connected device pages 





Figure 21: Intuitive Flow Diagram of the Heimdallr System (part 4) 
This figure gives a closer look at the relationship between the Heimdallr admin interface and its 




Figure 22: Intuitive Flow Diagram of the Heimdallr System (part 5) 
This figure gives a closer look at the relationship between the Heimdallr user web interface and 
the two IoT devices used in Heimdallr system simulation. It also shows the steps taken by the users 




Figure 23: Intuitive Flow Diagram of the Heimdallr System (part 6) 
This figure gives a closer look at the relationship between the Heimdallr and the two connected 
IoT devices used in Heimdallr system simulation 
86 
 
8.3 Appendix C 
 
 
Figure 24: VisualVM Monitor Screenshot of Heimdallr Software 
This figure shows CPU, Memory, Class, and Thread data of Heimdallr software gathered using an 
application analysis tool called VisualVM  
